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ARTICLE

Reexamining What We Stand to Lose: A Look
at Reinitiated Consultation Under the
Endangered Species Act
CATHERINE E. KANATAS* AND MAXWELL C. SMITH**

Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preservation than
the rich array of animal life with which our country has been
blessed. It is a many-faceted treasure, of value to scholars,
scientists, and nature lovers alike, and it forms a vital part of the
heritage we all share as Americans.
–Richard Nixon1
* Catherine E. Kanatas is an attorney at the United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and primarily represents the NRC Staff in
contested nuclear reactor proceedings. Mrs. Kanatas also clerked for the
Attorney General of Georgia and served as a research assistant at the
University of Georgia, where she graduated cum laude in 2009. Before law
school, Mrs. Kanatas worked in the education research field. She would like to
thank her husband and daughter who are the love of her life and sunshine,
respectively. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the positions of the NRC.
** Maxwell C. Smith is an attorney at the NRC, where he currently serves
as the Legal Counsel to NRC Commissioner, Kristine L. Svinicki. Prior to
working with Commissioner Svinicki, the primary focus of his practice was
representing the staff of the NRC in contested adjudicatory proceedings on
applications to renew nuclear reactor operating licenses. Mr. Smith has also
clerked for the Hon. Jackson L. Kiser in the Western District of Virginia and the
Hon. Charles E. Poston and Hon. Lydia C. Taylor in the Norfolk Circuit Court.
He graduated from Washington and Lee University, magna cum laude in 2005
where he contributed to the Capital Defense Journal. As always, he would like
to thank his incredible wife, Angela, daughter, Jasmine, and son, Raj, for their
laughter and love. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the positions of the NRC. The authors
would also like to thank Tison Campbell, Sean Croston, Anita Ghosh, and
Briana Grange for their invaluable input. This article is dedicated to the
memory of Lauren Woodall Roady, whose love of learning, the law, and nature
continues to inspire the NRC’s attorneys.
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For more than three decades, the Endangered Species Act has
successfully protected our nation’s most threatened wildlife, and
we should be looking for ways to improve it—not weaken it.
–Barack Obama2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Catastrophic. That is the claim from both sides in
Endangered Species Act (ESA) litigation. On the one hand,
interests as critical as national defense can be imperiled by
vigorous application of the ESA.3 On the other hand, an entire
species could become extinct if the law is not strictly applied.4
There is little room for error in either scenario.5 So who wins?
Who loses? And at what point are an agency’s duties under the
ESA over?
Most Federal agencies ensure ESA compliance through
consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively the
Service), as required by section 7 of the ESA.6 Given the high

1. 374 - Statement on Signing the Endangered Species Act of 1973, December
28, 1973, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 10, 2014, 6:30 PM),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4090.
2. Remarks by the President to Commemorate the 160 Anniversary of the
Department of the Interior, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Nov. 10, 2014, 6:38 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-commemorate160th-anniversary-department-interior.
3. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing the Navy’s need to conduct sonar training and
testing for national security purposes).
4. See id. at 1188-89 (discussing gray whales and some populations of
endangered sea turtles).
5. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir.
1992) (“This is a case about difficult choices. In 1988, Congress was asked to
choose between ensuring that our nation remains a world leader in
astrophysical research or protecting from almost certain demise an endangered
species on the brink of extinction.”).
6. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (“Each Federal
agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary
[elsewhere defined as NMFS and FWS], insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as
an ‘agency action’) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
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stakes of complying with the ESA, it is not surprising that ESA
consultation is the subject of considerable litigation and
commentary.7
However, reinitiated consultation, renewed
consultation required when circumstances underlying the initial
consultation materially change, has similar consequences.8 But,
there is little case law or academic research examining when an
agency must reinitiate consultation and the consequences if the
agency improperly fails to reinitiate.9 Moreover, unlike the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), where the procedural
requirements to prepare an environmental impact statement end
when the agency takes its federal action,10 the ESA’s
implementing regulations11 contemplate reinitiated consultation
even years after an agency acts.12 Thus, under the ESA’s terms
and implementing regulations, once a species is listed as
endangered or threatened, it is protected now and into the future,
even if that protection comes at a high cost to society.
Additionally, the listing of a new species can trigger an
entirely new set of reinitiated consultations for an otherwisecomplete federal action.13 Currently, the Service is considering

endangered species or threatened species . . . .”); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15);
50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2014).
7. See, e.g., Jeremy Brian Root, Limiting the Scope of Reinitiation:
Reforming Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035
(2002) (describing the ESA’s consultation process as complex, lengthy, and
highly litigated).
8. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.
9. The following articles primarily constitute the existing literature: see
Deborah Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA Section 7 Consultation over Existing
Projects, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 115
(Donald C. Baur & William Robert Irvin eds., 2002); Root, supra note 7, at 1035.
10. See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989)
(noting that the requirement to supplement environmental impact statements
exists when an agency has yet to act and discovers new and significant
information).
11. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 401-53.
12. § 402.16(d). For example, the regulations require reinitiation of formal
consultation when the agency retains some discretionary involvement or control
over an action and a new species is listed that may be affected by the action. The
Act also provides extensive protection to all listed species regardless of whether
a consultation occurs under section 7. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
13. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(d).
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whether to list many more species.14 Thus, more and more
requests to reinitiate consultations appear likely. As a result,
understanding the legal basis, power, limits, and consequences of
reinitiated consultation is more critical than ever.
This article first examines the role reinitiated consultation
plays within Congress’s statutory framework and concludes that
in many ways, reinitiated consultation is the glue that holds the
ESA’s protective scheme together.15 While the ESA generally
prohibits any injury to an endangered species, Congress has
authorized the Service to permit such injuries under certain
circumstances.16 But these authorizations must be accompanied
by a limit that will trigger reinitiated consultation if exceeded.
Thus, without reinitiated consultation, these preauthorized
injuries or “takes” would prove gaping leaks in Congress’s
“Ark,”17 leaving little or no safety for endangered species.
Moreover, reinitiated consultation has significant real world
consequences for federal agencies and private parties.18 Failure
to reinitiate consultation when legally required can subject the
agency and its employees, as well as private parties, to civil and
even criminal liability.
Next, this article explores the legal basis for reinitiated
consultation.19 Despite its central role, Congress never provided
14. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Review of Native
Species that are Candidates for Listing as Endangered or Threatened; Annual
Notice of Findings on Resubmitted Petitions; Annual Description of Progress on
Listing Actions, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,104 (Nov. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt.17) (noting that “the current number of species that are candidates for listing
is 146”). Some of these species are very prevalent at or near power plants or
other major industrial installations operated by private entities under federal
licenses and permits.
15. See infra Part III.A. (discussing protective elements of the ESA and the
role of reinitiated consultation).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (empowering the Service to provide an “Incidental
Take Statement” authorizing a limited number of takes for a federal project). An
“Incidental Take,” or “take that results from a Federal action but is not the
purpose of the action” may be allowed if the Service “finds that an action may
adversely affect a species, but not jeopardize its continued existence” and then
prepares and approves the “Incidental Take Statement.” Section 7 Consultation:
A Brief Explanation, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. (last updated June 30, 2014),
available at http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/section7/section7.html.
17. See § 1536(b)(4).
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part IV.
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for reinitiated consultation within the Act itself.20 While the
Service has acknowledged this silence,21 the courts generally do
not raise this question of statutory authority.22 In light of the
ambiguities within the ESA and Congress’s clear direction in the
legislative history of the Act that it intended for agencies to
reinitiate consultation, this article concludes that the practice is
legally supportable.
Finally, given the significance of reinitiated consultation, and
the likelihood that it is here to stay, this article then explores how
courts have reviewed suits concerning reinitiated consultation.23
This discussion highlights potential challenges and best practices
for federal agencies and permittees. This article concludes that,
with few exceptions, courts have taken a surprisingly deferential
approach to reviewing agency decisions to reinitiate, or more
commonly not reinitiate, consultation. For example, courts have
allowed agencies to expand a project’s scope, duration, or impact
on listed species or to recalculate how to measure the impacts
altogether
without
requiring
reinitiated
consultation.24
Nonetheless, courts have taken a much stricter approach when
considering the triggers for reinitiated consultation and have
frequently insisted that those triggers be as meaningful and as
exact as possible.25
However, before discussing reinitiated consultation in detail,
this article provides some additional background on the ESA in
general and reinitiated consultation in particular. To understand
the purpose and effect of reinitiated consultation, one must first
understand several key ESA provisions – namely, the ESA’s
listing, liability, and consultation provisions.

20. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (entirely omitting the word “reinitiate”).
21. Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended;
Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 402).
22. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994)
(assuming that the ESA requires reinitiated as well as initial consultation).
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part V.B.
25. See infra Part V.A.3.
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE ESA’S KEY PROVISIONS
RELATED TO CONSULTATION AND
REINITIATED CONSULTATION
If you read the preamble to the ESA26 and believe the
Supreme Court,27 you would conclude that the ESA protects
endangered species at any cost.28 There is certainly evidence of
this: just ask the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)29 or loggers
in the Pacific Northwest.30 The ESA is called the “pit bull of
environmental laws”31 for good reason. Unlike NEPA, the ESA
has substantive requirements in addition to procedural
These requirements are extensive33 and
requirements.32

26. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
27. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill (TVA), 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978) (noting that
the plain intent of Congress in enacting the ESA was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost).
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (emphasis added); Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, 275-83 (1969)
(prohibiting transportation of endangered species). In contrast, the ESA
“provide[s] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved.” Id. (emphasis added);
Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926,
926-29 (1966) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to purchase lands for
purposes of preserving endangered species); TVA, 437 U.S. at 180 (The Supreme
Court has observed, “[a]s it was finally passed, the Endangered Species Act of
1973 represented the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”). Previous laws protecting
endangered species were far more limited; for example they empowered the
executive to create sanctuaries for endangered species or restricted
transportation of those species.
29. See TVA, 437 U.S. 153. The ESA famously led to the Supreme Court’s
TVA decision that halted construction of a nearly complete, multi-million-dollar
Federal dam.
30. Candee Wilde, Evaluating the Endangered Species Act: Trends in MegaPetitions, Judicial Review, and Budget Constraints Reveal a Costly Dilemma for
Species Conservation, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 324-35 (2014). Since the Service
named the Northern Spotted Owl as a listed species pursuant to the ESA, “over
two hundred logging mills in the Pacific Northwest have closed and thousands of
logging employees have lost their jobs.” Id. at 324.
31. Id. at 310. It has also been called the “Magna Carta of the environmental
movement.” WATER ON THE EDGE (Water Education Foundation 2005) (interview
with Kevin Starr at 29:12).
32. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349-50
(1989). “NEPA itself does not mandate particular results.” Id. at 350. Instead,
NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to “ensure[] that the agency . . .
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compliance with them can cost agencies and individuals delay
(with corresponding costs) or even stop projects in their tracks if a
protected species would be jeopardized. Moreover, violations of
ESA requirements can result in large civil or criminal penalties.34
But the real story is not that simple. By the plain terms of
the ESA, endangered species sometimes lose because “takes”35
are permitted by the statute.36 Further, the ESA’s procedural
and substantive requirements do not guarantee that a species
will flourish.37 In fact, the Service has only de-listed thirty-two
species for reasons of recovery out of the hundreds of species
listed in the Act’s nearly thirty-year history.38 And, unlike many
environmental laws, which tend to have a decreasing impact on
the American economy as industry conforms to new
environmental standards, the ESA’s impact increases each year

carefully
consider[ed],
detailed
information
concerning
significant
environmental impacts.” Id. at 359.
33. Root, supra note 7, at 1036 (noting commenters have described
completing the consultation process as a “bottomless bureaucratic morass”).
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
35. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012) (defining take as “to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct” regarding protected species). “Harm,” in this context, is “an act
which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding,
feeding or sheltering.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.
(Sweet Home), 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
37. Wilde, supra note 30, at 324-25 (noting that the Northern Spotted Owl
population has remained stagnant, even after listing). Though the Supreme
Court’s decision in TVA halted the Tellico dam project, the dam was later built
after an act of Congress. Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic
Megafauna: A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L.
463, 486 (1999) (“Ironically, however, soon after the dam's completion, FWS
discovered healthy populations of snail darters in other Tennessee rivers and
down-listed the species from endangered to threatened.”).
38. See Delisting Report, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.gov/
tess_public/reports/delisting-report (last visited Jan. 12, 2015); see also Steven
P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, The Pronounced Presence and Insistent
Issues of the Endangered Species Act, SP036 ALI-ABA 447, 454 (2009) (noting
that, as of 2009, the Service had only de-listed twenty five of the hundreds of
species listed in the Act’s nearly thirty year history).
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A. Listing a Species Under the ESA
The ESA’s primary purpose is to protect and recover
imperiled species and the ecosystems upon which they depend.40
The ESA’s protections include section 7 conservation and
consultation requirements and section 9 protections against
takes. But before a species can receive the protection provided by
the ESA, the species must be listed as an endangered or
threatened species.41 Thus, how the ESA defines endangered and
threatened species and how species are listed have critical
ramifications.42
Section 3 of the ESA provides definitions for species,
endangered species, and threatened species. Under section 3,
“species” includes “any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and
any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish
or wildlife which interbreeds when mature.”43 Thus, a species for
ESA purposes can be a true taxonomic species, a subspecies, or in
the case of vertebrates, a distinct population segment.
An endangered species is defined as “any species which is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range.”44 A threatened species is defined as “any species which is

39. See generally Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 38.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be
appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in
subsection (a) of this section.”). See also Listing and Critical Habitat: Overview,
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. (last updated Jul. 31, 2014), https://www.fws.gov/
endangered/what-we-do/listing-overview.html.
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
42. This article does not extensively discuss the delisting of species. For more
information on that topic, see Kurtis A. Kemper, Delisting of Species Protected
Under Endangered Species Act, 54 A.L.R. FED. 2D 607 (2011).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
44. Id. § 1532(6). The statute provides an exception to this; specifically, “a
species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest
whose protection under the provisions of this chapter would present an
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likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”45
Section 4 provides for the listing of endangered and
threatened species.46 As noted above, the FWS and NMFS share
responsibilities for administering the ESA.47 The FWS has
jurisdiction over land and freshwater species.48 NMFS has
jurisdiction over marine species and anadromous species (fish
that swim up river to spawn).49
Species can be listed in one of two ways: the Service can list a
species by rule, using a candidate assessment process50 or an
individual can petition for a species to be listed.51 To be
considered for listing, the species must meet one of five factors in
ESA section 4(a)(1):
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
(C) [declining population due to] disease or predation;
overwhelming and overriding risk to man” is not considered an endangered
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
46. See id. § 1533. Section 4 also provides for the designation of critical
habitat. Id.; see also Ann K. Wooster, Designation of “Critical Habitat” Under
Endangered Species Act, 176 A.L.R. FED. 405 (2002).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2014).
48. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b); see also Endangered Species Act, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2014) (“Generally, [NMFS] manage[s] marine species, while []FWS manages
land and freshwater species.”). These species are listed at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h)
and 50 C.F.R. § 17.12(h). The critical habitats are found in 50 C.F.R. § 17.95, 50
C.F.R. § 17.96, and 50 C.F.R. Part 226.
49. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b); Endangered and Threatened Marine Species
under NMFS' Jurisdiction, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/esa/listed.htm#fish (last updated Jan. 15,
2015); see also Endangered Species Act, supra note 48 (noting that NMFS has
jurisdiction over 102 listed species).
50. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.15(b) (2014). Under section 4, the Secretaries of the
Department of the Interior and Commerce, whose departments include FWS
and NMFS respectively, work together to list threatened and endangered
species. Id.; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b).
51. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(a). The procedures
are the same for both types of listing except that there is a 90-day screening
period for petitions. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
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(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms [for
preservation]; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence.52

If the current condition of a species meets one or more of
these factors, it is considered a candidate for listing. Under the
ESA’s implementing regulations on listing, a “candidate” species
is “any species being considered by the Secretary for listing as an
endangered or a threatened species, but not yet the subject of a
Importantly, “[u]nlisted species, species
proposed rule.”53
petitioned by citizens for listing, species which the Federal
government has termed ‘candidates’54 for listing, or even species
which the federal government has proposed to list, do not receive
any of the substantive protections of the Act.”55 Therefore, the
Service’s listing decisions are highly scrutinized56 and
controversial.57

52. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a)(1).
53. 50 C.F.R § 424.02(b).
54. See id. There is a conference requirement imposed on agencies related to
candidate species. See Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 979 F.2d 1561, 1564 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
55. Jay Tutchton, Listing and Critical Habitat Decisions and Related Issues
Under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act, 2012 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
7B, 7B-1.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1533. Under the ESA, the public may participate in the
informal rulemaking for listing decisions and designation of critical habitat.
Additionally, courts have allowed organizations to enforce the ESA on behalf of
a species. E.g,. N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash.
1988) (Sierra Club could represent interests of Northern Spotted Owl in
challenging failure of FWS to list the owl); see Constance E. Brooks, Challenging
Agency Action and Inaction: the Problem of Leading a Horse to Water, 2004
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12A. Thus, petitioners can and do sue under the
Administrative Procedure Act to compel action on the listing of candidate
species. But see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997) (right to sue is
limited to litigants seeking to protect the species).
57. Spear, 520 U.S. 154. This article does not discuss these controversies. For
some examples of listing controversies: see Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 479; see also
Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding
unreasonable delay in listing decision, given statutory requirement to make a
listing decision within one year after a petition is filed); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v.
Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1995); Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt,
63 F. Supp. 2d 31, 35 (D.D.C. 1999).
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The only consideration in the listing process is the biological
status of the species, based on the best scientific and commercial
data available.58 Economic factors cannot be considered during
the listing process.59 Potential candidate species are then
prioritized, with any potential “emergency listing” given the
highest priority, including species that face a “significant risk to
the well-being of any species.”60
The Service’s current list of candidate species is published in
the Federal Register61 and on the FWS’ and NMFS’s websites.62
Several of these candidate species live at or near existing major
industrial facilities.63 Thus, listing these species could have a
substantial impact on American infrastructure. Moreover, the
Service has entered into settlement agreements with petitioners
that have already resulted in the listing of dozens of new
species.64 As discussed in more detail below, if a new candidate
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (2014); see
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife; Final Listing Priority Guidance for Fiscal
Year 2000, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,114 (Oct. 22, 1999). Congress amended the ESA in
1982 by adding the word “solely" to prevent any consideration other than the
biological status of the species. See infra Part IV. In doing so, Congress rejected
President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 12291, which required economic
analysis of all government agency actions. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,291,
46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
59. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(b). Previously, the ESA allowed for consideration of
economic impact when designating critical habitat, but the ESA was
subsequently amended. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7); see also Endangered and Listed Species; Listing
and Recovery Priority Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 24,296 (June 15, 1990).
61. Annual Description of Progress on Listing Actions, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,104,
70,106 (Nov. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.17).
62. Candidate
Species
Report,
U.S.
FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/candidateSpecies.jsp (last visited Oct. 8,
2014); Proactive Conservation Program: Species of Concern, NAT’L MARINE
FISHERIES SERV., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/concern/ (last updated
Dec. 23, 2014).
63. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding
on a Petition to List Eriogonum kelloggi (Red Mountain buckwheat) and Sedum
eastwoodiae (Red Mountain stonecrop) as Endangered or Threatened Species, 79
Fed. Reg. 56,029, 56,038 (Sep. 18, 2014) (noting that mining activities were
evaluated, but found not to disturb species); see, e.g., Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Species Act Listing Determination
for Alewife and Blueback Herring, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,944, 48,956-57 (Aug. 12,
2013) (noting that herring occur within the vicinity of power plants).
64. See generally Federico Cheever, Greater Sage-Grouse, Lesser PrairieChickens, and Dunes Sagebrush Lizards: Developments in the Courts, Federal
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species is listed,65 the species receives many protections under
the ESA, and a Federal agency taking action is required to
consult and may be required to reinitiate formal consultation
with the Service.66 Moreover, interested members of the public
may seek to enjoin activities based on an agency’s failure to
initiate formal consultation or to adequately reinitiate
consultation.
B. Sections 9 and 11: No Takes . . . or Else
Once listed, a species enjoys substantial protection from
human encroachment under section 9 of the ESA.67 Section 9 of
the ESA declares that “with respect to any endangered species of
fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is
unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States to . . . take any such species within the United States or
the territorial sea of the United States.”68 The ESA defines a
“take” as a “means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct” and person to be any “individual, corporation,
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity.”69
Based on these expansive definitions, section 9 prohibits almost
any entity, including both private entities and government
agencies, from undertaking nearly any activity that could hurt an
endangered species in any way.
Moreover, the ESA does not just prohibit taking endangered
species on paper. Section 11 provides for civil and criminal
Agencies, and the States Regarding Imperiled But Not (Yet?) Listed Species, 58
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 23.01 (2012) (discussing two settlement agreements
entered into by the Service and petitioners). Importantly, “the court settlements
themselves do not generally require listing. Rather, they require . . . FWS to
make decisions that species listing is either warranted or not warranted and to
follow through on those decisions.” Id. § 23.06, at 23-18.
65. See Endangered Species Act (ESA), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/ (last updated Oct. 10, 2014)
(noting that currently there are approximately 2,195 species listed under the
ESA).
66. See infra Parts II.C-D.
67. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 1532(13), (19).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss1/4

12

4_KANATAS&SMITH FINAL

2015

8/24/2015 12:06 PM

ESA: REINITIATED CONSULTATION

237

penalties for violations of the ESA, including section 9; the
penalties include fines of up to $50,000 and up to one year
imprisonment.70 Moreover, section 9(g) of the ESA permits
citizen suits to enjoin activities that violate the Act’s provisions. 71
Thus, federal agencies, as well as everyone else, have a strong
incentive to avoid ESA violations.
C. Listing Triggers Initial Consultation Under ESA
Section 7
Once listed, a species is also protected by the ESA’s section 7
consultation
requirement.72
The
ESA’s
consultation
requirements apply only to federal agencies, not private
individuals or states.73 These consultation requirements allow an
agency to avail itself of the Service’s expertise in assessing the
impact of the proposed project and the feasibility of adopting
reasonable alternatives.74
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires that each federal agency
consult with the Secretary of Commerce or the Interior to “insure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
. . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species.”75

70. 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
71. Id. § 1540(g).
72. Id. § 1536(b)(4). As discussed in more detail below, section 7 is also the
mechanism agencies use to acquire authorization for take of listed species. See
Peg Romanik & John C. Martin, Take Under the Endangered Species Act, 2012
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 8A. Section 7 also provides agencies a procedure to
apply to the Endangered Species Committee to exempt a project from the ESA.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p); see generally Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered
Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing Committee's role).
73. See Devon Lea Damiano, Licensed to Kill: A Defense of Vicarious Liability
Under the Endangered Species Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1543, 1558 (2014).
74. See Ky. Heartwood, Inc. v. Worthington, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1084 n.8
(E.D. Ky. 1998); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536; 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.13, 402.14, 402.16
(2014).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). See also 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(a), (b) (“If the subject
species is cited in 50 CFR 222.23(a) or 227.4, the Federal agency shall contact
the NMFS. For all other listed species the Federal Agency shall contact the
FWS.”); 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (“Jeopardize the continued existence of means to
engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to
reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed
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As the FWS has explained, the ESA contains several
provisions designed to facilitate and expedite consultation:
First, Section 7(c) provides that each federal agency shall . . .
request information from the Secretary of the Interior or
Commerce whether any listed species is present in the area of the
proposed action. If the Secretary advises that such species may
be present, the agency undertaking the action shall conduct a
biological assessment for the purpose of identifying any listed
species “which is likely to be affected by such action.” . . . [A]fter
the conclusion of consultation, the Secretary shall provide the
federal agency with an opinion [biological opinion or (BiOp)]
“detailing how the agency action affects the species or its critical
habitat[;]” if the Secretary finds jeopardy to the species or
adverse modification of critical habitat, the Secretary shall
suggest reasonable and prudent alternatives that he believes
would not violate Section 7(a)(2).76

If there is a finding of jeopardy, the agency must modify or
abandon its proposal.77 If there’s a finding of no jeopardy, but the
project is likely to result in incidental takings of listed species,
the Service issues an Incidental Take Statement (ITS) with the
BiOp.78 The ITS provides terms and conditions that, if complied
with, will shield the agency and any applicant from section 9
liability.79 Additionally, private entities may apply for an
Incidental Take Permit (ITP) under section 10 of the ESA, which
has a similar, but more limited, effect.80 While parties are not
species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of
that species.”).
76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Thomas v. Pac. Rivers Council, 514
U.S. 1082 (1995) (No. 94-1332) (internal citations omitted).
77. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)-(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i). Service must issue an
ITS if its biological opinion concludes no jeopardy to listed species or adverse
modification of critical habitat will result from the proposed action, but the
action is likely to result in incidental takings. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)-(c); 50
C.F.R. § 402.14(i). As long as any takings comply with the terms and conditions
of the ITS, the action agency is exempt from penalties for such takings. 16
U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2).
79. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(2).
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (noting that the otherwise prohibited act
must be for scientific purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the
affected species).
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required to follow the terms of an ITS or ITP, they frequently
choose to do so in light of section 9’s stringent liability
provisions.81
The ESA’s implementing regulations provide a structure for
section 7 consultation, which is highly complex, lengthy and often
the subject of litigation.82 Nonetheless, the FWS and NMFS have
guidance on this process.83 Agencies have also developed
guidance to work through the consultation process.84
D. ESA’s Implementing Regulations for Reinitiated
Consultation
In contrast to the complex initial consultation regulations
and process, the Service has promulgated a single and specific
regulation governing reinitiated consultation. Specifically, 50
C.F.R. § 402.16 provides:
Reinitiation of formal consultation is required and shall be
requested by the Federal agency or by the Service, where
discretionary Federal involvement or control over the action has
been retained or is authorized by law and:
81. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170-71 (1997) (noting that agencies
disregard the terms of an ITS at their peril).
82. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.10-402.16; see Root, supra note 7, at 1036 (describing
the section 7 consultation process as complex, lengthy, and highly litigated).
83. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
ENDANGERED SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING
CONSULTATION AND CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1998) [hereinafter CONSULTATION HANDBOOK]; see
also Endangered Species Act Policies, Guidance, and Regulations, NAT’L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/policies.htm (last
updated Oct. 10, 2014) (providing links to guidance documents and policies on
section 7 Consultation, among other things). The section 7 Consultation
Handbook provides additional guidance on reinitiated consultation. See infra
Part II.D.
84. See, e.g., Paul Weiland, Corps of Engineers Issues Guidance Regarding
Section 7(a)(2) Consultation, ENDANGERED SPECIES L. & POL’Y (July 23, 2013),
http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/2013/07/articles/consultation2/corps-of-engineers-issues-guidance-regarding-section-7a2-consultation/
(discussing June 11, 2013 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ESA Guidance
memorandum); see also OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N, HYDROPOWER LICENSING AND ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE FOR
APPLICANTS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFF (2001), available at http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/hydropower/gen-info/guidelines/esa_guide.pdf (FERC’s guidance).
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(a) If the amount or extent of taking specified in the incidental
take statement is exceeded;
(b) If new information reveals effects of the action that may affect
listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an extent not
previously considered;
(c) If the identified action is subsequently modified in a manner
that causes an effect to the listed species or critical habitat that
was not considered in the biological opinion; or
(d) If a new species is listed or critical habitat designated that
may be affected by the identified action. 85

Thus, although reinitiated consultation is a powerful
concept—even after the agency acts, it still has requirements86 to
consult potentially years or decades later—this power is limited.
The text of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 clarifies that the requirement to
reinitiate consultation is only triggered when several precursors
are met. Specifically, reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. §
402.16 presumes the following: (1) there has been an agency
action; (2) the agency has retained discretionary involvement or
control over the action or such discretionary involvement or
control is authorized by law; and (3) a triggering event under 50
C.F.R. § 402.16 has occurred.87
1.

An Agency Action Prompting Initial Consultation

Reinitiation of formal consultation presumes that there has
been an agency action. The ESA states that section 7 applies to
“any action authorized, funded, or carried out” by a federal
agency.88 The ESA’s implementing regulations give examples of
what constitutes such agency action. Specifically, 50 C.F.R. §
402.02 notes that agency action includes: “(a) actions intended to
85. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(a)-(d) (2014).
86. Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended,
51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402)
(acknowledging that NMFS and FWS cannot require Federal agencies to
reinitiate consultation).
87. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. One might assume that another presumption
would be a previous formal consultation, since the text of the regulation is
reinitiation of formal consultation (emphasis added). However, as discussed
infra in note 99, courts have reasoned that reinitiation of consultation may be
required even where there was only previously informal consultation.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
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conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of
regulations; (c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases,
easements, rights-of-way, permits, or grants-in-aid; or (d) actions
directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or
air.”89 But the ESA’s implementing regulations then go on to
expressly limit the scope of what constitutes agency action, and
therefore what types of agency actions trigger section 7’s
consultation requirement, to those actions “in which there is
discretionary Federal involvement or control.”90 Therefore, initial
consultation is required when an agency has taken an
affirmative, discretionary action.91
2.

Discretionary Involvement or Control

In considering whether an agency has taken such an action,
courts first analyze whether a federal agency affirmatively
authorized, funded, or carried out the underlying activity. If so,
courts then determine whether the agency had some discretion to
influence or change the activity for the benefit of a protected
species.92 If the agency lacks the discretion to influence actions
that affect listed species, then section 7 is not triggered. For
example, in National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife93 the Supreme Court held that in light of the its
implementing regulations, the ESA is not triggered where an
agency is required by statute to undertake an action once certain
specified triggering events have occurred.94 The Court found the
Service reasonably determined that the ESA is not an affirmative

89. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. This list is only illustrative, not exhaustive;
“[e]xamples include, but are not limited to” the listed actions in 402.02(a) – (d).
Id. Thus, the definition of “agency action” under the ESA differs from the
definition under the Administrative Procedure Act, which defines action to
include a failure to act. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012).
90. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007).
91. See Karuk Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006, 1020-21 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1579 (2013); see also W. Watershed
Projects v. Matejko, 468 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2006).
92. See Karuk, 681 F.3d at 102; Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1507
(9th Cir. 1995).
93. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 673.
94. Id.

17

4_KANATAS&SMITH FINAL

242

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

8/24/2015 12:06 PM

[Vol. 32

grant of authority to effectively add another “entirely separate
prerequisite” to agency action, such as a requirement to consult
on the impact to listed species.95 In deciding whether an agency
has retained discretionary involvement or control over the action
to reinitiate consultation based on the listing of a new species,
courts have also held that the agency’s control must inure to the
benefit of the newly listed species.96
3.

Agency Retains Discretion or Control and A
Triggering Event Under § 402.16 Occurs

Once the Federal action is completed, reinitiated consultation
can only occur if the agency retains discretionary involvement or
control over the action and a triggering event under 50 C.F.R. §
402.16 occurs. These triggering events are: “(a) if the incidental
take is exceeded, (b) if new information reveals unanticipated
impacts on listed species or habitat, (c) if the action is
subsequently modified in a way that now impacts listed species or
habitat, or (d) if a new species or habitat is listed that may be
affected by the action.”97 If reinitiation of consultation is
triggered, then the Service must issue a new BiOp before a
project may go forward.98 Notably, each of the events in 50
95. Id. at 671.
96. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th
Cir. 2001) (reaffirming test laid out in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th
Cir. 1995)).
97. Root, supra note 7, at 1039, n.41 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014)).
98. Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1451 (9th Cir.
1992). Another interesting question concerns whether the agency must have
initially completed formal consultation for § 402.16 to apply. The Tenth Circuit
indirectly addressed this question in Center for Native Ecosystems v. Cables. Ctr.
for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 2007). The concurring
opinion found that because the FWS and Forest Service never entered formal
consultation, by virtue of a “not likely to adversely affect” finding, there was no
consultation to reinitiate under § 402.16. Id. at 1334 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
While the majority ostensibly took no position on this argument, the majority’s
reasoning clearly suggests that they would require agencies to revisit informal
consultations, at least those concluding in a not likely to adversely affect
finding. Cables, 509 F.3d at 1324-25, n.2 (noting that reinitiated consultation
would be required if a not likely to adversely affect finding “required utilization
levels to be met to remain valid” and new information showed that the levels
were not met). The District Court for the Virgin Islands has also opined that the
Service could reinitiate informal consultation. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA,
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C.F.R. § 402.16 would trigger formal consultation initially, as
each may adversely affect a listed species or habitat. Thus, each
of these events logically trigger reinitiated consultation because
the previously issued biological opinion is no longer consistent
with the current circumstances.99
III. REINITIATED CONSULTATION’S SIGNIFICANCE
From a conservation standpoint, reinitiated consultation
serves a pivotal role within the ESA. In passing the ESA,
Congress plainly intended to provide the highest level of
protection to listed species. But, Congress also provided for ITSs,
which authorize taking listed species in some limited
circumstances.100 However, without reinitiated consultation,
ITSs could become blank checks, potentially authorizing takes
that would jeopardize protected species and imperiling Congress’s
goal of saving species on the brink of extinction. Moreover,
reinitiated consultation has important legal consequences.
Failure to reinitiate consultation can invalidate ITSs, exposing
agencies and third parties to section 9 liability.101 The below
discussion helps explain where reinitiated consultation fits in to
the ESA process and how it helps serve the ESA’s purpose.
A. Reinitiated Consultation Serves as the Essential
Constraint on Incidental Take
1.

Congress Placed the Highest Priority On
Protecting Threatened and Endangered Species

The legislative history underlying the ESA consistently
emphasizes the importance of protecting threatened and
endangered species to preserve genetic heritage. The House

11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 550 n.31 (D.V.I. 1998). Thus, the stronger view is that
formal consultation is not a prerequisite to reinitiated consultation, at least
when the Service previously determined that formal consultation was not
needed because the action was not likely to adversely affect listed species.
99. Root, supra note 7, at 1040.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
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Report accompanying the legislation memorably illustrated the
high stakes:
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable.
The blue whale evolved over a long period of time and the
combination of factors in its background has produced a certain
code, found it its genes, which enables it to reproduce itself,
rather than producing sperm whales, dolphins, or goldfish. If the
blue whale, the largest animal in the history of the world, were to
disappear, it would not be possible to replace it – it would simply
be gone. Irretrievably. Forever.102

Congress extolled the value of what humanity stood to lose
through the accelerating disappearance of species from Earth:
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best
interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations.
The reason is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys
to puzzles which we cannot solve, and may provide answers to
questions which we have not yet learned to ask.
...
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of
plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? . . .
Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.103

These quotes demonstrate that, in passing the ESA,
Congress placed a tremendous value on guarding endangered
species, a benefit of “incalculable” value to society.104
2.

Reinitiated Consultation as a Needed Check on
ITSs

The ESA clearly furthers these considerations through its
prohibition on taking listed species. But as noted above, the Act
contains an important exception to this prohibition—the ITS,
which under certain conditions authorizes takes that would

102. H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 143 (1973).
103. Id. at 144.
104. See id. at 143.
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otherwise violate section 9.105 Nonetheless, in allowing for ITSs,
the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee cautioned,
“[t]he Committee intends that such incidental takings be allowed
provided that the terms and conditions specified by the Secretary
. . . are complied with.”106 Thus, Congress did not intend to
abandon the rigorous scheme of protection for endangered species
when it provided for ITSs. Rather, it envisioned that these
statements would act as limited exceptions to the ESA’s stringent
protections. Reinitiated consultation ensures that ITSs do not
metastasize past these limits.
The Ninth Circuit has explained, “[t]he terms of an [ITS] do
not operate in a vacuum. To the contrary, they are integral parts
of the statutory scheme, determining, among other things, when
consultation must be reinitiated.”107 In addition, “[e]ven a cursory
review of the regulations governing formal consultation
demonstrates that [ITSs] supplement [biological opinions], and
were not meant to stand alone.”108 “Without the ‘no jeopardy’
determination contained in the underlying [biological opinion],
the [ITS] potentially pre-authorizes take for an action that could
subsequently be determined to jeopardize the existence of an
endangered species. Such a result would be contrary to the ESA’s
fundamental purpose.”109 Consequently, if the action results in
greater takings than those envisioned by the ITS, the action

105. See supra Part II.
106. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807,
2826, 1982 WL 25083.
107. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229,
1251 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
108. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). As
described above, the Service will only issue an ITS for actions that will “not be
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of listed species.” CONSULTATION
HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 4-45. Typically, the ITS will contain an estimate of
the amount of takings “anticipated from the action.” Id. at 4-47. By definition,
these takings take will not “reach the level of jeopardy or adverse modification.”
Id. at 4-49. Additionally, the ITS must contain terms and conditions that include
sufficient monitoring requirements to ensure that the Service and action agency
will know if the project results in takings that exceed the anticipated levels of
take in the document. Id. at 4-54.
109. Allen, 476 F.3d at 1036.
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agency must immediately stop the action causing the taking and
reinitiate formal consultation.110
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has reasonably rejected attempts to
unhook the ITS from the duty to reinitiate formal consultation. In
Allen, the FWS argued, “[ITSs] need not allow for reinitiation of
consultation.”111 Instead, the FWS contended that ITSs “serve
only to lift [section] 9’s bar on take.”112 But, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that authorizing a take of a listed species without any
additional limit, “is inadequate because it prevents the action
agencies from fulfilling the monitoring function the ESA and its
Such a
implementing regulations clearly contemplate.”113
reading would effectively “expand the [ITS’s] liability exemptions
beyond the scope that has been established by Congress and by
the ESA’s implementing regulations.”114
3.

Reinitiated Consultation Protects the Service’s
Careful Balance in the Jeopardy Determination

Moreover, reinitiated consultation protects the jeopardy
finding itself, which rests on a complex scientific analysis
conducted by Service’s experts in the biological opinion. In
deciding whether a federal action will jeopardize any listed
species, the Service must carefully describe the action and the
action area;115 the life history, population dynamics, and status
and distribution of listed species in the area;116 the
environmental baseline for these species, which is to say the
current health of these species without regard to the federal
action;117 the direct and indirect effects of the action;118 and the
cumulative effects of development on the action area.119 The
110. Id. at 1034-35. The action agency is the agency proposing an action that
may affect listed species.
111. Id. at 1040.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1040-41.
114. Id. at 1041.
115. CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 4-15.
116. Id. at 4-19 to 4-22.
117. Id. at 4-22 to 4-23.
118. Id. at 4-23 to 4-30.
119. Id. at 4-31 to 4-32.
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Service must then weigh the effects of the action and cumulative
effects against the current status of the species to determine
whether the action is likely to jeopardize that species’ continued
existence.120
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has noted, “[w]hen reinitiation of
consultation is required, the original biological opinion loses its
validity.”121 The regulations require reinitiated consultation
when the project exceeds the stated level of take in the ITS or
when new information arises concerning the project or listed
species in the area.122 Plainly, these are the types of occurrences
that would call into question the validity of the underlying “no
jeopardy” finding.
Therefore, reinitiated consultation acts as an essential limit
on an ITS, which is the primary exception to the Act’s prohibition
against harming listed species. Without reinitiated consultation,
ITSs could effectively be blank checks because they would
authorize takings of unknown impact, potentially even
jeopardizing species already facing extinction.123
B. The Consequences of Failing to Reinitiate
Consultation
While reinitiated consultation is important from a
conservation standpoint, failure to reinitiate consultation can also
lead to serious legal consequences for federal agencies and third
120. Id. at 4-35.
121. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d
1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (citing Or. Natural Res. Council v.
Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007)). However, the Eleventh Circuit has
noted, “[t]here is no precedent in our circuit to support Petitioners’ argument
that [the agency’s] choice to reinitiate consultation with NMFS and FWS
automatically renders the former biological opinions invalid.” Defenders of
Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., 684 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis added). Because this opinion focused on the agency’s choice to
reinitiate consultation, as opposed to changed circumstances requiring the
reinitiation, it does not directly relate to whether an ITS remains valid when 50
C.F.R. § 402.16 requires consultations. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014).
122. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(a)-(b).
123. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting
that when the action agency failed to undertake mitigation measures relied on
by the BiOp, the Service found that the action could jeopardize listed species
and requested reinitiated consultation).
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parties. An ESA violation is hardly academic—section 9
violations can lead to significant civil and criminal penalties,
including fines and imprisonment. According to the Ninth Circuit,
an ITS loses its validity when circumstances require reinitiated
consultation, and the action agency is exposed to potential section
9 liability until reinitiated consultation leads to a new ITS.124
Because the ITS represents the primary bulwark against section
9 liability, federal agencies and licensees have a powerful
incentive to reinitiate consultation to ensure that the protection
remains effective.125
If the federal action is ongoing, either because the federal
agency is undertaking the action or still deciding whether to
authorize another’s actions, then the potential for section 9
liability and the duty to reinitiate consultation is clear.126 But,
for licensing and permitting actions, the exposure to liability
under section 9 may remain, even after the licensing action is
over. Section 9 of the ESA defines “taking” to include actions that
cause another to take a listed species.127 A number of Circuit
Courts have interpreted these provisions to include government
licensing and permitting activities within the definition of a
“take” under the Act, because the license or permit is a proximate
cause of the underlying take.128
124. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 698 F.3d at 1108 (emphasis added) (citing
Allen, 476 F.3d at 1037).
125. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o) (2012).
126. See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 596-99 (9th
Cir. 2006).
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1), (g).
128. Although this proposition is perhaps counterintuitive, it is the recognized
law in many circuits, and no circuit has ever held otherwise. See Loggerhead
Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia, 148 F.3d 1231, 1251-53 (11th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing the potential for a locality to be held liable under the ESA because
“a genuine issue of fact exists in this case that the lighting activities of
landowners along Volusia County’s beaches—as authorized through local
ordinance—violate the ESA.”); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294,
1301 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that the EPA could be liable under the ESA for
takings caused by pesticides manufactured by a third party because “the EPA’s
decision to register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue these
registrations was critical to the resulting poisonings of endangered species”);
Damiano, supra note 73, at 1570; cf. Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801, 819
(5th Cir. 2014) (demonstrating that while the Fifth Circuit has not found that
certain licensing actions will trigger section 9 liability, it has clearly
acknowledged the possibility).
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In the leading case of Strahan v. Coxe, the First Circuit
directly addressed the question of whether a permitting agency
could be civilly and criminally liable under section 9 of the ESA
for takings committed by its licensees.129 In that case, an
environmental group sought an injunction under the ESA against
two Massachusetts agencies on the grounds that the state
regulation of commercial fishing directly led to the take of
northern right whales.130 Specifically, the group claimed that the
use of lobster pots and gillnets as licensed by Massachusetts
entangled the whales causing distress and death.131
The First Circuit found, “a governmental third party
pursuant to whose authority an actor directly exacts a taking of
an endangered species may be deemed to have violated the
provisions of the ESA.”132 The court rejected Massachusetts’s
argument that regulating commercial fishing was no different
than licensing automobiles or drivers, which plainly does not
cause a taking under the ESA.133 The First Circuit noted that in
such licensing actions, the driver’s use of the automobile to
violate federal law constitutes an intervening cause, breaking
classic notions of proximate causation.134 In contrast, lobster pot
and gillnet fishing are so “likely to result in a violation of federal
law,” that “it is not possible for a licensed commercial fishing
operation to use gillnets or lobster pots in the manner permitted
by the Commonwealth without risk of violating the ESA by
exacting a taking.”135 Several other circuits have also considered
this question and adhere to this view.136

129. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 164 (1st Cir. 1997).
130. Id. at 158-59. The name “right whale” itself is a sad reminder of the past
– the term gained currency because that species was the “right” one to harpoon.
Right Whale Fact Sheet, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.
gov/animals/9364.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
131. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 158-59.
132. Id. at 163.
133. Id. at 163-64.
134. Id. at 164.
135. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 164. The First Circuit reaffirmed this view. Strahan
v. Linnon, No. 97-1787, 1998 WL 1085817 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998).
136. See, e.g., Aransas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801, 819 (5th Cir. 2014);
Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia, 148 F.3d 1231, 1251-53 (11th Cir.
1998).
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Consequently, for federal permitting and licensing agencies,
the duty to reinitiate consultation may remain an important
consideration years after the federal action is complete. As noted,
the Ninth Circuit has indicated that any circumstances requiring
reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 will invalidate
the existing ITS.137 But the protections afforded by the ITS can
be crucial to the agency or its employees for the duration of any
license or permit issued. Without them, the agency may find itself
unable to successfully defend against section 9 liability arising
from the actions of the licensees or permittees. Even for nonlicensing agencies, the ITS can be an important bulwark during
the duration of the direct federal action, which can take years.
Therefore, federal agencies face potentially significant
consequences if they incorrectly evaluate whether circumstances
warrant reinitiated consultation, as do private parties who are
also protected by the terms of an ITS.
C. Conclusions
When viewed in context, reinitiated consultation is one of the
most important components of the ESA. Without it, the ESA’s
entire scheme of protection could collapse through unlimited
ITSs, which would shield agencies and industries from liability
long after the species they were meant to protect expired.
Moreover, failure to properly reinitiate consultation can yield
dramatic impacts for agencies and third parties. When
circumstances require reinitiated consultation, ITSs become
invalid.138
As a result, agencies and licensees lose their
protections against section 9 liability. Therefore, given the
important stakes surrounding reinitiated consultation, for people
and protected animals, it is critical that agencies understand
when they must reinitiate consultation and the consequences of
not doing so. Unfortunately, as described below, Congress hardly
provided a clear roadmap in the ESA for navigating the jungle of
reinitiated consultation.

137. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d
1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012).
138. See supra Part III.B.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND REINITIATED
CONSULTATION
Despite the importance of reinitiated consultation, Congress
never explicitly provided for it in statute.139 Thus, the Service’s
regulation requiring reinitiated consultation140 lacks an overt
statutory basis.141 Indeed, the Service acknowledged as much in
the Federal Register notice accompanying the current version of
the regulation.142 Despite this lack of a statutory basis, no court
appears to have explicitly addressed the legal basis for reinitiated
consultation.
Although the statutory language itself is silent on reinitiated
consultation, it also does not contain language limiting an
agency’s ESA obligations to one consultation or restricting
consultation to the pendency of the federal action. Rather, it only
states, “[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.”143
This ambiguity over the scope and frequency of consultation could
justify resorting to the legislative history to determine whether
the Service’s interpretation of reinitiated consultation in 15
C.F.R. § 402.16 is reasonable.144 On balance, that legislative
history suggests that Congress understood reinitiated
139. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012) (extensively discussing consultation but
never mentioning reinitiated consultation).
140. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 1536.
142. In response to a comment on the proposed reinitiated consultation
regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, the Service acknowledged “its lack of authority to
require Federal agencies to reinitiate consultation if they choose not to.”
Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended, 51
Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402). In
contrast, the Service generally has power to bring enforcement actions against
any entity, including other agencies, for noncompliance with any provision of the
ESA itself. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
143. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). In fact, the ESA does not further define the terms
“action,” “authorized,” “funded,” or “carried out.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532.
144. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (noting that when the meaning of a statute is unclear, a court will defer
to the interpretation of the expert agency charged with administering that
statute).
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consultation to be a part of the section 7 process. Consequently, if
courts were to consider the legal basis for reinitiated
consultation, the legislative history would provide significant
support for reinitiated consultation.
A. The Legislative History Assumes Reinitiated
Consultation Will Occur
In a House Report accompanying the 1982 amendments to
the ESA, which added the provisions regarding ITSs, the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries explicitly
addressed reinitiated consultation. It stated, “[i]f the specified
impact on the species is exceeded, the Committee expects that the
Federal agency or permittee or licensee will immediately
reinitiate consultation since the level of taking exceeds the
impact specified in the initial Section 7(b)(4) statement.”145 The
report continued, “[i]n the interim period between the initiation
and completion of the new consultation, the Committee would not
expect the Federal agency or permittee or licensee to cease all
operations unless it was clear that the impact of the additional
taking would cause an irreversible and adverse impact on the
species.”146
This statement contains a number of notable assumptions.
Most obviously, this portion of the legislative history establishes
that the Committee undeniably envisioned reinitiated
consultation as part of the ESA. Moreover, it confirms that the
duty to reinitiate consultation is closely linked to the terms of the
ITS, as noted by the Ninth Circuit.147 On the other hand, it does
not mention reinitiating consultation when new information
shows a greater impact on already-listed species or the Service
lists a new species in the action area, which indicates that the
last three components of the reinitiation standard in 50 C.F.R. §
402.16 may go beyond the Committee’s intent.148 Additionally

145. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807,
1982 WL 25083.
146. Id.
147. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2007).
148. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(b)-(d) (requiring reinitiated consultation when a new
listed species is discovered within the vicinity of the federal action, the federal
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the description in House Report 567 states that the Committee
would not ordinarily expect the federal action to cease after
reinitiating consultation, which suggests that section 7(d)’s bar on
making an “irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources
with respect to the agency action” should perhaps not apply
during reinitiated consultation.149 Last, because the language
notes that this expectation would also apply to licensees’ or
permittees’ “operations,” it appears that the Committee
envisioned reinitiated consultation occurring after licensing
actions as well as direct federal actions.150
In 1999 and 2001, two unsuccessful bills aimed at
reauthorizing the ESA attempted to reform the process for
reinitiated consultation. In 1999, Representative Young of Alaska
introduced H.R. 3160, a bill entitled “Common Sense Protections
The bill, which had 41
for Endangered Species Act.”151
cosponsors, provided,
Whenever a determination to list a species as an endangered
species or a threatened species or a designation of critical habitat
requires reinitiation of consultation on an already approved
action, the consultation shall commence promptly, but not later
than 90 days after the date of the determination or designation,
and shall be completed not later than 1 year after the date on
which the consultation is commenced.”152

In 2001, Senator Smith of Oregon introduced a bill with
identical language regarding reinitiated consultation.153
While neither bill was successful, the inclusion of a
discussion on reinitiated consultation indicates that at least some
members of Congress accepted it as an established feature of the
action changes, or subsequent information shows a new impact of the action on
listed species); H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27.
149. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2012). See also H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27; but see
infra note 170 (presents a view to the contrary).
150. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 27.
151. Common Sense Protections for Endangered Species Act, H.R. 3160, 106th
Cong. (1999). The accompanying House Report contained little additional
information regarding the portion of the legislation related to reinitiated
consultation. H.R. REP. NO. 106-1013, at 13 (2000), 2000 WL 1623050.
152. H.R. REP NO. 106-1013, at 46.
153. S. 911, 107th Cong., at 55 (2001).
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section 7 consultation process by 2000. Importantly, while both
bills represented an attempt to reform reinitiated consultation,
neither bill questioned its legal basis or sought to provide a
specific authorization for reinitiated section 7 consultation. In
addition, both bills expressly mentioned reinitiated consultation
arising from the listing of a new species or designation of a
critical habitat, providing additional support for the practice.154
B. The Scarcity of References to Reinitiated Consultation
Is Unremarkable
On the other hand, Congress has considered the ESA on
numerous occasions and often deliberated extensively on the
law.155 While this consideration generated hundreds of pages of
discussion, the only references to reinitiated consultation in the
Congressional record are the ones discussed above. The paucity of
references to reinitiated consultation may appear to suggest that
most members of Congress either did not believe that the ESA
required it or never considered the question.
Yet, the dearth of references to reinitiated consultation in the
legislative history to the ESA may have more to do with how the
section 7 consultation process evolved than anything else. First,
reinitiated consultation is integrally tied to ITSs.156 However,
Congress did not amend the ESA to provide for ITSs until
1982.157 Thus, for most of the Act’s legislative history, Congress
would have had little reason to discuss reinitiated consultation.

154. See H.R. 3160 § 7(a)(8)(B); S. 911 § 4(e)(5)(B).
155. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Appropriation Authorization,
Pub. L. No. 96-246, 94 Stat. 348 (1980); Tellico Dam Rider to the 1980 Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437
(1980); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Appropriation Authorization, Pub. L.
No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225 (1979); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978,
Public L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978); Endangered Species Act, Extension of
Appropriation Authorization, Pub. L. No. 95-212, 91 Stat. 1493 (1977);
Endangered Species Act, Appropriation Authorization Extension, Pub. L. No.
94-325, 90 Stat. 724 (1976); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205,
87 Stat. 884 (1973).
156. See supra Part II.A.2.
157. An Act to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 for fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985, and for
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 4(b)(4), 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
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Second, the entire section 7 consultation process came to
occupy an increasingly prominent role as the Act developed. In
1979, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
extensively discussed the history and current state of section 7
consultation.158 The Committee noted, “[t]his one small section
has developed into one of the most significant portions of the
entire statute.”159 “Although section 7 has been in effect since
1973, this consultation procedure was not formally instituted
until January of [1979].”160 The Report noted that from the time
Congress enacted the ESA in 1973 to 1979, the Service conducted
approximately 4,500 consultations, which largely consisted of
informal discussions between the Service and Federal
agencies.161 Many of these discussions may have consisted of
only a simple telephone call.162 However, by 1979, with formal
consultation procedures in place, the Committee expected that
the Service could engage in 20,000 consultations in one year.163
Moreover, the Report indicates that the Committee came to
see section 7 consultation as a pragmatic way to balance the strict
conservation goals of the Act with economic development. The
Committee noted that “the celebrated snail darter case,” TVA v.
Hill, had interpreted section 7 to prohibit completing any federal
project that could jeopardize a listed species.164
But, the
Committee found that the “popular press has grossly exaggerated
the potential for conflict under the Act” between conservation
goals and development.165 Rather, the Committee concluded that
“in many instances good faith consultation between the acting
agency and the [Service] can resolve many endangered species
conflicts.”166 Thus, the legislative history underlying the Act
indicates that section 7 in general, and the consultation process
in particular, came to assume a more prominent place in the
158. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 4-13 (1979), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
9453, 1978 WL 8486.
159. Id. at 7.
160. Id. at 11.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id. at 11.
164. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 10.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Id. at 12.
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protective scheme as time went on. Therefore, the limited number
of references to reinitiated consultation in the legislative history
is, perhaps, not as telling as it may initially seem about
Congress’s views on the topic. Rather, the rarity of discussions
regarding reinitiation may be expected given the time it took to
recognize the importance of section 7 consultation.
C. Congress Has Generally Advanced Conservation Over
Economic Development
Additionally, the rest of the legislative history of the ESA
suggests that reinitiated consultation is consistent with
Congress’s overall approach to protecting listed species.
Doubtlessly, reinitiated consultation protects listed species at the
cost of an economic hardship to federal licensees and permittees
as well as those who benefit from direct federal action.167 But in
the 1982 amendments, which established the ITS process, the
Congress voiced a clear preference for conservation over economic
development. Specifically, Congress amended the Act to provide
that the Service shall make listing determinations under section
4 “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available.”168
The Committee explained that it “strongly
believe[d] that economic considerations have no relevance to
determinations regarding the status of species and intends that
the economic analysis requirements of Executive Order 12291,
and such statutes as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the
Paperwork Reduction Act not apply.”169
Therefore, on balance, the legislative history supports
reinitiated consultation. While it only contains a few direct
references to reinitiated consultation, the existing references
indicate that Congress understood reinitiated consultation to act
as an important limit on ITSs. Additionally, given the relatively
late introduction of ITSs into the act, the scarcity of these
167. For a vivid description of the potential economic hardships flowing from
reinitiated consultation, see Root, supra note 7, at 1055-59.
168. An Act to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 for fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985, and for
other purposes, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 2(b), 96 Stat. 1411 (1982).
169. H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 20 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807,
1982 WL 25083.
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references to reinitiated consultation, which is fundamentally
connected to ITSs, appears natural. Finally, in the decades-long
legislative history of the ESA, Congress almost always chose to
value protecting endangered species over economic development,
particularly in the 1982 amendments, which introduced the ITS
and saw the most significant reference to reinitiated consultation
in the Congressional record. In sum, the legislative history
supports reinitiated consultation.
V. WHAT THE COURTS HAVE TO SAY ABOUT
REINITIATED CONSULTATION CLAIMS
As the legislative history and case law makes clear,
reinitiated consultation serves a similar function to the initial
consultation requirement in section 7. Namely, it protects species
and avoids the irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources until consultation is reinitiated and a new biological
opinion prepared170 or the agency, license or permit applicant
applies for an exemption, if needed.171 Like initial consultation,
reinitiated consultation can have a drastic impact on the parties
involved172 and raises environmental issues that are “rarely black
or white, usually complex, frequently difficult to delineate, and
often troubling to resolve.”173

170. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.09 (stating that after initiation or reinitiation of
consultation required under section 7(a)(2) of the Act, the Federal agency and
any applicant shall make no irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources with respect to the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing
the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternatives
which would avoid violating section 7(a)(2)); Vill. of False Pass v. Watt, 565 F.
Supp. 1123, 1155 (D. Alaska 1983).
171. N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 354 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding
that if after the start of agency action, new information suggests that the action
may imperil an endangered species, resources may not be granted in violation of
this chapter, and consultation must begin again).
172. See Arthur D. Smith, Programmatic Consultation Under the Endangered
Species Act: An Anatomy of the Salmon Habitat Litigation, 11 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 247, 252-54 (1996) (discussing the Pacific Rivers case and noting that the
Snake River National Forests are populated only by rural communities that
depend on logging, mining, and ranching on Federal lands).
173. Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1459 (9th Cir.
1992) (discussing what constitutes a new, unforeseen, or unanticipated
development).
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Currently, there is not a considerable amount of case law on
reinitiated consultation.174 The case law that exists is mostly in
the Ninth Circuit,175 and only a few other circuit courts directly
address 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.176 Not surprisingly, other circuits
rely heavily on the Ninth Circuit case law.177 However, the
volume of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 litigation is likely to increase given
the number of species the Service is considering listing.178
A careful examination of the case law reveals that despite the
ESA’s well-founded reputation as the “pit bull” of environmental
laws,179 courts will normally take a surprisingly deferential
approach to reinitiated consultation. While courts will carefully
scrutinize ITSs to ensure that they provide clear criteria for
triggering reinitiated consultation, when it comes to determining
if those criteria are met, courts generally defer to an agency’s
interpretation.180 In particular, courts have declined to require
reinitiated consultation, even when agency decisions expand the
scope, size, or duration of the project or substantially alter the
methodology for calculating when take levels are exceeded.181
A. You Should Have Done Better: ESA Violations
In a handful of older proceedings, courts found ESA
violations based on a failure to properly reinitiate consultation.
The case summaries below offer action agencies and applicants
perspective on what they should and should not do to avoid a
challenge of inadequate reinitiation of consultation.

174. In contrast, there is a considerable body of case law on listing, initial
consultation, takes, and other areas of the ESA. See 3 GEORGE CAMERON
COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 29:32 (2d ed. 2014).
175. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
176. See Waterkeeper Alliance v. Dep’t of Def., 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988).
177. See, e.g., Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1035; see also Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA,
11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 549-51 (D.V.I. 1998).
178. To see a “live” list of candidate species, go to FWS’ species reports.
Environmental Conservation Online System, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (last
visited Oct. 29, 2014), http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/.
179. See Wilde, supra note 30, at 310.
180. See, e.g., Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1388.
181. See infra Part V.A.
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Pacific Rivers: FWS’ Programmatics Trigger
Reinitiation of Consultation

In Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether the U.S. Forest Service’s programmatics
(forest plans used to evaluate and authorize specific permit
applications, also called “land resource management plans”)
constituted agency actions triggering section 7 reinitiated
consultation.182 The Forest Service issued the programmatics in
1990, and NMFS later listed the Snake River chinook salmon as
threatened.183 Petitioners brought suit and argued that the
Forest Service must reinitiate consultation on the programmatics
with the NMFS in light of chinook-salmon-listing.184 The Forest
Service replied that it was not required to reinitiate consultation
because the programmatics “are not ongoing agency action
throughout their duration, but only when they were adopted in
1990 or if they are revised or amended in the future.”185
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reasoned that the
programmatics themselves “represent ongoing agency action
throughout their duration” because:
[land resource management plans] are comprehensive
management plans governing a multitude of individual projects.
Indeed, every individual project planned in both national forests
involved in this case is implemented according to the LRMPs.
Thus, because the LRMPs have an ongoing and long-lasting
effect even after adoption, we hold that the LRMPs represent
ongoing agency action.186

Importantly, the court ruled that both the site-specific
actions and programmatics triggered the reinitiation of
consultation, as both had the potential of injuring a newly listed
species.187 On remand, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction of all projects on Forest Service land in Idaho “until all

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id. at 1057.
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questions surrounding [Forest Service] compliance with the ESA
have been resolved.”188 This injunction affected 342 activities in
six national forests, including thirty-seven mines with more than
800 workers.189
Pacific Rivers is considered a landmark case for several
reasons.190 First, Pacific Rivers took a broad view of what
constitutes agency action triggering reinitiated consultation.
Second, the remedy in Pacific Rivers has been called striking
because it appears the court ordered the injunctions without
considering the harm to local communities despite the fact that
NMFS found that the challenged activities did not threaten
salmon.191 Pacific Rivers is also illustrative of the high stakes of
ESA litigation. As in Pacific Rivers, the health of a listed species
is often balanced with agencies trying to fulfill their statutory
duties and communities relying on permitted activities for their
livelihood. Who wins and who loses is not always clear. For
example, after the protracted litigation in Pacific Rivers, which
clearly constituted a major victory for the environmental
movement, the environmental group agreed to stay the injunction
due to political pressure.192 Given this backdrop, much of the
reinitiation case law following Pacific Rivers represents an effort
to limit the scope of reinitiated consultation.193 This withdrawal
from the high-water mark of Pacific Rivers may explain later
courts’ surprisingly deferential approach to reviewing agency
decisions to reinitiate consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.194
188. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 873 F. Supp. 365, 371 (D. Idaho 1995).
189. Smith, supra note 172, at 290 n.204.
190. Root, supra note 7, at 1035.
191. Smith, supra note 172, at 251 (“Pending reconsultation on plans, the
courts ordered across-the-board injunctions against thousands of ongoing forest
activities—despite [Forest Service] or NMFS findings that these activities did
not threaten salmon and without regard to the harm such injunctions would
cause to local communities.”).
192. Id. at 290.
193. See Root, supra note 7, at 1036 (“The real attraction of section 7
reinitiation is not necessarily the protection of endangered species, but a
powerful incentive to enjoin hundreds of site-specific projects through a single
programmatic injunction.”). Congress has also proposed bills specifically
limiting the amount of time available to conduct reinitiation of consultation. See
S. 911, 107th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3160, 106th Cong. (1999); Root, supra note 7, at
1062-1064 (discussing H.R. 3160 and S. 911).
194. See infra Part V.B.
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Refusing to Reinitiate Can Get You In Trouble

While the most interesting part of Pacific Rivers is the broad
definition of agency action that triggers reinitiated consultation,
at its bottom it is a case where the court found an ESA violation
because the action agency refused to reinitiate consultation.
Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Marsh, the court found an ESA
violation because the action agency refused to reinitiate
consultation when it failed to successfully undertake mitigation
measures the Service relied on in issuing the BiOp.195 In Marsh,
the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Federal Highway
Administration were funding the construction of a flood control
channel and roads in the flood plain of the Sweetwater River.196
The construction affected the endangered California least tern
and the light-footed clapper rail.197 The Service’s BiOp identified
the preservation of 188 acres of nearby wetlands as one measure
for mitigating the project’s effects.198 When the Corps did not
acquire these lands,199 the Service determined that the agency
action was now likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the
endangered rail and tern.200 The Service requested that the
Corps reinitiate consultation, but the Corps refused.201 The
Sierra Club and League for Coastal Protection sued and claimed
that the Corps violated the ESA by failing to reinitiate
consultation.202
The court agreed and held that the Corps’ failure to acquire
the mitigation lands triggered reinitiation of consultation.203 The
court reasoned that while the ESA does not give the Service “the
power to order other agencies to comply with its requests or to
veto their decisions,”204 ESA section 7 does impose a duty on all

195. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
196. Id. at 1378.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1379.
199. Id. at 1380.
200. Id. at 1381.
201. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1381.
202. Id. at 1381.
203. Id. at 1388.
204. Id. at 1386 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371-72
(5th Cir. 1976); see also Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of
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federal agencies to consult.205 The court found that reinitiation of
formal consultation was triggered in this instance because
discretionary federal involvement or control over the action had
been retained and new information revealed that the action could
affect listed species to an extent not previously considered.206
Thus, in a handful of instances, courts have found that agencies
improperly failed to reinitiate consultation – typically when new
information undermined the validity of the previous consultation,
such as when a new species is listed or when a planned
mitigation measure does not occur.
3.

An Inadequate ITS Is Asking for Trouble

While courts infrequently find ESA violations based on a
failure to reinitiate consultation, courts are far more likely to find
ESA violations based on an inadequate ITS. Though these cases
do not directly pertain to reinitiated consultation, they have a
close nexus to the topic because the ITSs govern when reinitiated
consultation is required.
a.

An ITS Not Predicated on a Take Violates the
ESA

Several courts have found an ESA violation when an ITS was
not predicated on an incidental take.207 In Arizona Cattle
Growers’ Association v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,208 the Ninth
Circuit considered ITSs related to the Arizona Cattle Growers’
Association’s (ACGA) application for cattle grazing permits in
Southeastern Arizona.209 The FWS issued a BiOp that analyzed
twenty species of plants and animals on land within an area
supervised by the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) Saffold

1973, as Amended, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,956 (June 3, 1986) (codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 402)).
205. Id. at 1385 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
206. Id. at 1387 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.16).
207. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (o) (2012) (noting that the Service may provide
an ITS when an action will lead to incidental takes).
208. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229
(9th Cir. 2001).
209. Id. at 1233.
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and Tucson, Arizona, field offices.210 While the BiOp concluded
that the livestock grazing program “was not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of the species affected nor was likely to
result in destruction or adverse modification of the designated or
proposed critical habitat,”211 the FWS nonetheless issued an ITS
for several species of fish and wildlife listed or proposed to be
listed.212 ACGA and a rancher seeking a grazing permit on the
lands challenged the ITS on the grounds that it was arbitrary and
capricious because there was insufficient evidence of an actual
take to support the ITS.213
In arguing that the ITSs were appropriate, the FWS claimed
that the word “taking” in section 7(b)(4) “should be interpreted
more broadly than in the context of Section 9” given the different
purposes of the sections (protective vs. punitive, respectively).214
The Ninth Circuit, like the district court below, rejected this
argument and stated that the “definition of ‘taking’ in Sections 7
and 9 of the ESA are identical in meaning and application.”215
The Ninth Circuit explained that the ESA was amended to
“resolve the conflict between Sections 7 and 9” and that Congress
made clear that:
[the] purpose of Section 7(b)(4) and the amendment to Section
7(o) is to resolve the situation in which a Federal agency or a
permit or license applicant has been advised that the proposed
action will not violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Act but the proposed
action will result in the taking of some species incidental to that
action—a clear violation of Section 9 of the Act which prohibits
any taking of a species.216

210. Id. (“The Bureau of Land Management’s livestock grazing program for
this area affects 288 separate grazing allotments that in total comprise nearly
1.6 million acres of land.”).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; see Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1034 (D. Ariz. 1998).
214. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1237. The district court had
already rejected this argument. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1044-45 (D. Ariz. 1998).
215. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1237.
216. Id. at 1239-40 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2826, 1982 WL 25083).
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that “[a]bsent an actual
or prospective taking under Section 9, there is no ‘situation’ that
requires a Section 7 safe harbor provision.”217 In fact, the Ninth
Circuit went so far as to say that the FWS’ interpretation of
“taking” “would turn the purpose of the 1982 Amendment on its
head”218 and “would allow the [FWS] to engage in widespread
land regulation even where no Section 9 liability could be
imposed.”219 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit, like the district court
below, held that the FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously
because the ESA did not provide the FWS with authority to
impose conditions on the land when a taking was not present.220
The Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n court also pointed out the
FWS’ argument that it “should be able to issue an [ITS] based
upon prospective harm” was flawed because the ESA’s
regulations require a separate procedure, i.e., the reinitiation of
consultation, if different evidence is later developed.221 The court
stated that “[a]bsent this procedure, however, there is no
evidence that Congress intended to allow the Fish and Wildlife
Service to regulate any parcel of land that is merely capable of
supporting a protected species.”222 Thus, while the ESA does
provide considerable protection to listed species, potentially at the
expense of private landowners and others, it does not provide the
Service unfettered authority to impose conditions on the use of
land.223
217. Id. at 1240.
218. Id.
219. Id. The court also stated that the FWS’ “handbook instruction to issue an
[ITS] when no take will occur as a result of permitted activity is contrary to the
plain meaning of the statute as well as the agency's own regulations.” Id. at
1242.
220. Id. at 1242.
221. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1244.
222. Id. at 1244.
223. While this limit is logically satisfying, it can lead to inconsistent results
in practice, in light of the dynamic ecosystems in which Federal agencies act. As
one commenter has noted, for actions that result in an ITS during the section 7
consultation process, most licensing agencies will simply include a license
condition implementing the terms of the ITS, which will require reinitiated
consultation when the circumstances described in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 are met.
Root, supra note 7, at 1060; CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 6-64.
As a result, agencies can easily reinitiate consultation on those projects that
previously received an ITS. But, the Service does not issue a BiOp or ITS for all
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ESA Violation Because ITS Did Not Adequately
Trigger Reinitiated Consultation

Even when an ITS is based on a “take,” courts have held that
the ITS violated the ESA if it did not adequately provide a
requirement for reinitiated consultation. These findings are
logical because as explained above and by the Ninth Circuit, the
purpose of an ITS is to “set forth a ‘trigger’ that, when reached,
results in an unacceptable level of incidental take, invalidating
the safe harbor provision, and requiring the parties to re-initiate
consultation.”224 When the ITS does not fulfill this purpose, the
purposes of the ESA will not be served. Below are some examples
of when courts have held that an ITS did not properly provide a
trigger for the reinitiation of consultation.
i.

The Taking of All is Not a Reasonable
Trigger

In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Allen, the Ninth
Circuit considered an ITS which allowed taking “all” northern
spotted owls.225 The court held that ITSs are arbitrary and
capricious when they allow a take level that is “coextensive with
the scope of the project” because such statements could never
trigger the reinitiation of consultation.226 The court explained
that:

projects, and under the holding in Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, the action
agency would logically have no ITS to implement into the terms of the license.
See Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1251; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (2014). But,
due to changing ecosystems, new species can move into the environment of any
project or the Service can later decide to list existing species within a project’s
vicinity. Although this could happen anywhere, Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n
effectively restricts agencies to only reinitiating consultation at those facilities
with BiOps, because only those facilities will have ITSs giving rise to license
conditions. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1244-45. While section 9
liability continues to apply to these facilities, without a license condition
requiring monitoring and reporting that liability provides greatly reduced
protection to listed species at facilities without BiOps because the Service’s
limited resources will likely restrict it from ever learning of these violations. See
generally Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 38.
224. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1249.
225. Or. Natural Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007).
226. Id. at 1041.
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[t]he regulations governing Incidental Take Statements also
provide for ongoing monitoring of incidental take by the action
agency and the FWS. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3) instructs the action
agency or applicant to monitor the impacts of incidental take by
reporting on the project’s impact on the species as specified in the
incidental take statement. The regulation further instructs the
action agency to reinitiate consultation immediately if the
amount or extent of specified take is exceeded in the course of the
action. The FWS’ own Consultation Handbook terms this point
“reinitiation level.” Thus, the terms of an Incidental Take
Statement do not operate in a vacuum. To the contrary, they are
integral parts of the statutory scheme, determining, among other
things, when consultation must be reinitiated. 227

The Allen court also noted that Congress clearly intended for
ITSs to allow for reinitiation of consultation.228 In particular, the
court noted the House Report which provided the Committee’s
expectation that if the specified impact on the species is exceeded,
“the Federal agency or permittee or licensee will immediately
reinitiate consultation since the level of taking exceeds the
impact specified in the initial Section 7(b)(4) statement.”229 Thus,
the court held that an ITS that authorized the take of “all spotted
owls,” without any additional limit, was inadequate “because it
prevents the action agencies from fulfilling the monitoring
function the ESA and its implementing regulations clearly
contemplate.”230
ii. Take What? An Unclear ITS Standard Is
Not a Sufficient Reinitiation Trigger
Given the ESA’s monitoring function, it is not surprising that
courts have also held that reinitiation of formal consultation is
not adequately triggered by an ITS that does not set a clear
standard for determining when the authorized level of take has
227. Id. at 1040 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
228. Id.
229. Or. Natural Res. Council, 476 F.3d 1040 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at
27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2827, 1982 WL 25083).
230. Id. at 1040-41. The court went so far as to say that such an ITS “reads out
of the statute” the idea of reinitiation. Id. at 1041. But, as discussed, the idea of
reinitiation is not in the statute itself. See supra Part IV.
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been exceeded.231 For example, in Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether an ITS related to cattle
grazing on a cow flat allotment under FWS’ control properly
specified the amount of anticipated take of loach minnow.232 The
ITS at issue did not provide a specific number of loach minnow;
instead, it defined the incidental take in terms of habitat
characteristics. The ITS specified that take would be exceeded if
several conditions are not met,233 including if “ecological
conditions do not improve under the proposed livestock
ACGA challenged the terms and
management plan.”234
conditions of the ITS, in particular the “ecological conditions not
improving” condition.235 ACGA asserted that the ITS “fail[ed] to

231. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229,
1251 (9th Cir. 2001).
232. Id. at 1249. The Ninth Circuit “agree[d] with the district court that the
issuance of the Cow Flat Incidental Take Statement was not arbitrary and
capricious” because the FWS “provided evidence that the listed species exist on
the land in question and that the cattle have access to the endangered species’
habitat. Accordingly, the [FWS] could reasonably conclude that the loach
minnow could be harmed when the livestock entered the river.” Id. at 1248.
However, the Ninth Circuit was considering whether the anticipated take
provisions were appropriate. The district court had ruled that “neither the
specificity of the anticipated take provision nor the ‘reasonable and prudent
measures’ condition was arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 1235.
233. Id. at 1248-1249.
234. Id. at 1249 (quotations omitted).
235. The relevant portion of the ITS stated:
The service concludes that incidental take of loach minnow from the
proposed action will be considered to be exceeded if any of the
following conditions are met:
[Condition 1] Ecological conditions do not improve under the
proposed livestock management. Improving conditions can be
defined through improvements in watershed, soil condition, trend
and condition of rangelands (e.g., vegetative litter, plant vigor, and
native species diversity), riparian conditions (e.g., vegetative and
geomorphologic: bank, terrace, and flood plain conditions), and
stream channel conditions (e.g., channel profile, embeddedness,
water temperature, and base flow) within the natural capabilities of
the landscape in all pastures on the allotment within the Blue River
watershed.
Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1249.
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specify the amount or extent of authorized take with the required
degree of exactness.”236
In considering the take “trigger” in the ITS, the court noted
that, ideally, the “trigger” should be a specific number.237
However, the court noted that while preferred, a specific number
was not required.238 The court pointed to examples where ITSs
were upheld that used a combination of numbers and estimates
as a “trigger”239 and cited to legislative reports showing that
Congress anticipated that a precise number would not always be
possible.240 The court adopted the reasoning of the district court
in concluding that “‘the use of ecological conditions as a surrogate
for defining the amount or extent of incidental take is reasonable
so long as these conditions are linked to the take of the protected
species.’”241 In adopting this approach, the Ninth Circuit noted
that it is consistent with the ESA section 7 Consultation

236. Id. at 1249-50 (“ACGA argues that it is entitled to more certainty than
vague and undetectable criteria such as changes in a 22,000 acre allotment's
“ecological condition.”) (internal quotations omitted).
237. Id. at 1249 (citing Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997)
(snowmobiling activity may take no more than two wolves)); Fund for Animals v.
Rice, 85 F.3d 535 (11th Cir. 1996) (municipal landfill may take fifty-two snakes
during construction and an additional two snakes per year thereafter); Mount
Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992) (telescope
construction may take six red squirrels per year); Ctr. for Marine Conservation
v. Brown, 917 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (shrimping operation may take
four hawksbill turtles, four leatherback turtles, ten Kemp's ridley turtles, ten
green turtles, or 370 loggerhead turtles)).
238. Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1249. However, the court noted
that “[i]n the absence of a specific numerical value . . . the [FWS] must establish
that no such numerical value could be practically obtained.” Id. at 1250.
239. Id. at 1249–50 (citing Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 441 n.12 (9th Cir.
1996) (utilizing both harvesting rates and estimated numbers of fish to reach a
permitted take)); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (D. Ariz. 1997) (concluding that an ITS that
indexes the permissible take to successful completion of the reasonable and
prudent measures as well as the terms and conditions is valid); Pac. Nw.
Generating Coop. v. Brown, 822 F. Supp. 1479, 1510 (D. Or. 1993) (ruling that
an ITS that defines the allotted take in percentage terms is valid)).
240. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1250 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97–
567, at 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2827, 1982 WL 25083)
(“The Committee does not intend that the Secretary will, in every instance,
interpret the word impact to be a precise number. Where possible, the impact
should be specified in terms of a numerical limitation.”).
241. Id.
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Handbook, which states that for purposes of an ITS, take can be
expressed as:
a change in habitat characteristics affecting the species (e.g., for
an aquatic species, changes in water temperature or chemistry,
flows, or sediment loads) where data or information exists which
links such changes to the take of the listed species.
In some situations, the species itself or the effect on the species
may be difficult to detect. However, some detectable measure of
effect should be provided. . . . [I]f a sufficient causal link is
demonstrated (i.e. the number of burrows affected or a
quantitative loss of cover, food, water quality, or symbionts), then
this can establish a measure of the impact on the species or its
habitat and provide the yardstick for reinitiation. 242

The court clarified that by “causal link” it meant that the
FWS must “establish a link between the activity and the taking of
species before setting forth specific conditions.”243 The court
rejected the FWS’ argument that the ITS “‘provides for those
studies necessary to provide the quantification of impacts which
the [ACGA] claim is lacking.’”244 Instead, the court found that
the ITS’s analysis that “if ‘ecological conditions do not improve,’
takings will occur” was too vague to establish a causal link
between the condition and the take.245 Additionally, the court
noted that the vague condition left the Service with “unfettered
discretion” to determine whether there was compliance with the
condition, “leaving no method by which the applicant or the
action agency can gauge their performance.”246 Further, the
court found that the vague condition imposed a duty on ACGA to
ensure the “general ecological improvement” of the 22,000-acre
cow flat allotment.247
Thus, the court held that the
implementation of the ITS was arbitrary and capricious because
of the “the lack of an articulated, rational connection between

242. CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 83, at 4-50; see also Ariz. Cattle
Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1250.
243. Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 273 F.3d at 1250.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1251.
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Condition 1 and the taking of species, as well as the vagueness of
the condition itself.”248
Similarly, in Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, the Ninth
Circuit held that an ITS that lacked adequate monitoring and
reporting requirements violated the ESA.249 The ITS at issue
concerned the effects of the Leavenworth National Fish
Hatchery’s (“Hatchery”) operation and maintenance from 2006–
2011 on the Icicle Creek bull trout, a threatened species.250
While the ITS set a clear numerical cap on the annual take of the
bull trout,251 petitioners claimed that the ITS had inadequate
monitoring and reporting requirements.252 The ITS anticipated
that
up to twenty migratory bull trout will be injured each year,
because Hatchery operations will significantly disrupt their
breeding behavior by preventing or delaying their spawning
migration. Yet, the Statement does not require the Hatchery to
monitor and report the actual number of bull trout so harmed. 253

In considering whether the ITS was adequate, the court
looked no further than the ESA’s implementing regulations.
Specifically, the court quoted 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3)254 and
248. Id.
249. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, 628 F.3d 513, 532 (9th Cir. 2010). In
this case, the Service was both the action agency and the consulting agency. Id.
at 518 (“Formal section 7 consultation begins when the ‘action agency’ (here, the
Service in its capacity as the operator of the Hatchery) transmits a written
request to the ‘consulting agency’ (here, the Service in its consulting capacity).”);
see Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1223
(9th Cir. 2008); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(c) (2014).
250. The Hatchery was established to replace salmon “spawning grounds in
the upper Columbia River made inaccessible by the completion of the Grand
Coulee Dam, which blocks fish migration.” Salazar, 628 F.3d at 517.
“Unfortunately, and somewhat ironically, the Hatchery itself blocks fish passage
in Icicle Creek.” Id.
251. Specifically, the ITS set the “the following annual limits on incidental
take: (1) one bull trout killed and one harmed by the water intake system; and
(2) twenty migratory bull trout injured because their access to historically
accessible spawning habitat is impaired, significantly disrupting their breeding
behavior.” Id. at 530.
252. Salazar, 628 F.3d at 531.
253. Id.
254. Id. This regulation provides that “[i]n order to monitor the impacts of
incidental take, the Federal agency or any applicant must report the progress of
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stated that this regulation “makes clear that the Service is
responsible for specifying in the [ITS] how the action agency is to
monitor and report the effects of the action on listed species.”255
To meet this requirement, the court reasoned that the Service’s
ITS must either “specify monitoring and reporting requirements
with respect to the twenty-bull trout limit or, if appropriate,
select a surrogate trigger that can be monitored.”256 Because the
ITS did neither, the court held that it did not establish a
meaningful trigger for reinitiation of consultation.257
Likewise, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Evans,258 the district court rejected an ITS that purported to set
the impermissible level of take at “any individual.”259 The court
explained that it was extremely unlikely that the taking of a
single marine animal would actually be detected.260 Therefore,
the court found that the terms in the ITS did not provide a
reasonable trigger for reinitiation of consultation.261
In summary, courts will carefully scrutinize an underlying
ITS to ensure that it lays a reasonable framework for reinitiating
consultation. These courts have held that the Service can only
issue an ITS when the underlying action will actually lead to
takes. Moreover, these courts have held that while an ITS should
ideally provide a specific number of takings that will trigger
reinitiated consultation, the ITS must, at a minimum, provide
sufficiently clear criteria for reinitiating consultation. But, if the
ITS provides sufficiently clear criteria for reasonable

the action and its impact on the species to the Service as specified in the
incidental take statement.” Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3)) (emphasis in
original).
255. Id. at 532.
256. Id. at 532 (emphasis in original).
257. Id. Judge Fisher dissented in part, but concurred in the majority’s ruling
on the ITS. Id. at 533, 537 (Judge Fisher “dissent[ed] from Parts II.A, II.B, II.E
and III. of the majority opinion, but otherwise concur[red].”).
258. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
259. Id. at 1187.
260. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (“It is arbitrary and capricious to set the
trigger at one animal unless defendants can adequately detect the taking of a
single animal.”).
261. Id. at 1184.
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consultations, courts will seldom second-guess agencies’ decisions
regarding whether those criteria are met, as described below.
B. You Did Good! No ESA Violation
As discussed above in Part V.A, there are multiple precursors
before reinitiation of consultation is required. As a result, courts
have frequently found that circumstances did not require
reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. For example,
there is no ESA violation if the Service or a private party requests
an agency to reinitiate consultation, but the agency: (1) lacks
discretionary authority or control over the project, or (2) the
circumstances alleged to require reinitiated consultation do not
meet the four criteria in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. Further, there is no
duty to reinitiate consultation if Congress has provided for a
waiver of ESA requirements for the agency action.
1.

No Discretionary Authority or Control
a.

Sierra Club

While not formally a reinitiation case, Sierra Club v.
Babbitt,262 laid the conceptual groundwork for the Ninth Circuit’s
more limited approach to reviewing 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 in the
wake of Pacific Rivers.263 In Babbitt, the BLM entered a
reciprocal right-of-way agreement with a timber company, under
which the BLM and the timber company could access existing
roads and build new roads over each other’s land.264 That
agreement required the timber company to submit a plan for any
262. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (1995).
263. See Root, supra note 7, at 1048-49 (noting that unlike Pacific Rivers,
Babbitt stressed agency discretion that could benefit a listed species as the key
element in deciding whether the agency had a duty to consult and also
describing how this holding would be influential in later reinitiated consultation
cases). See also Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
264. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1505. Congress authorized these agreements to allow
the government and private land owners easier access to their own lands in
light of the “checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private forestland
ownership.” Id.; see also 43 C.F.R. § 2812.0-3, 2812.0-6 (2014) (explaining the
current status of the authorization). Originally, the timber company was
Woolley Logging Company, which subsequently assigned its rights to the Seneca
Timber Company. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1505, 1506.
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proposed road over BLM land to the agency for approval.265 BLM
could object if (1) another route was more direct, (2) the proposed
route “would substantially interfere with existing or planned
facilities,” or (3) the plan would cause excessive soil erosion.266 In
addition, the timber company agreed to follow all applicable
environmental laws and also agreed that the BLM could
withdraw any approvals if the timber company violated those
laws.267
Pursuant to this agreement, the timber company submitted a
plan to build an 810-foot road over BLM land. Before approving
the road, the BLM prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA)
and concluded that the road would lead to logging activities that
may affect the spotted owl, a listed species.268 But the BLM
declined to pursue section 7 consultation with the FWS because it
lacked discretionary authority under the reciprocal agreement to
modify the proposal for the owl’s benefit.269 The Sierra Club
sought to enjoin construction of the road on the grounds that
BLM should have consulted with the FWS on the project.270
The court considered whether the BLM’s approval would
trigger initial consultation, as opposed to reinitiated consultation,
because the BLM entered the reciprocal agreement before
Congress passed the ESA.271 Nevertheless, because the court
evaluated when an agency could require further consultation on
an ongoing Federal project, the case addresses factual
circumstances identical to most reinitiated consultation
questions, and the court actually looked to 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 for
the applicable standard—whether the agency retains
“‘discretionary Federal involvement or control.’”272 Given the
BLM’s limited ability to object to a proposed road under the
reciprocal agreement, the court found that the agency lacked
265. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1505-06.
266. Id. at 1505.
267. See id. at 1506. Seneca Timber Company agreed to these additional
environmental conditions when it assumed rights under the reciprocal
agreement. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1507.
271. See id. at 1505.
272. Id. at 1509 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.03) (emphasis in original).
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discretionary involvement or control under the ESA because it
could not “implement measures that inure to the benefit of the
protected species.”273
Moreover, the court found that the
environmental provisions did not provide authority to enter
consultation because they only allowed the BLM to act if the
timber company violated the ESA or other environmental law;
they did not provide the BLM with prospective authority to
condition the authorization.274 Thus, the Ninth Circuit declined
to require the BLM to enter consultation with the service on the
proposed road.275 The court noted that these limits on the
agency’s authority to condition the authorization distinguished
the case from Pacific Rivers.276
b.

Environmental Protection Information Center
v. Simpson Timber Co.

In Environmental Protection Information Center v. Simpson
Timber Co. (EPIC), the Ninth Circuit squarely applied the Sierra
Club framework to reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. §
402.16.277 In that case, the FWS had previously issued an ITP to
the Simpson Timber Co. (Simpson) under section 10 of the ESA
for the northern spotted owl.278 Subsequently, the FWS listed the
marbled murrelet and the coho salmon as threatened species,
both of which were potentially affected by Simpson’s logging
operations.279
The plaintiff, the Environmental Protection
Information Center (EPIC), sought to enjoin Simpson’s ongoing

273. Id.; see also Root, supra note 7, at 1049 (noting that the requirement that
the discretion inure to the benefit of a listed species acts as a further limit on
reinitiated consultation beyond the text of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, which only
requires some discretion or control, regardless of whether it could benefit a
listed species).
274. Babbitt, 65 F.3d at 1510-11.
275. Id. at 1509. The dissent found that the ability to object on the grounds of
whether the route was the most direct could potentially benefit the spotted owl.
Id. at 1514.
276. Id. at 1509 (citing Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054-56
(9th Cir. 1994)).
277. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2001).
278. Id. at 1074-76. For a discussion of ITPs, see infra Part II.C.
279. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1074-76.
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operations because the subsequent listings required the FWS to
reinitiate consultation with itself on the ITP.280
EPIC argued that under Pacific River’s expansive test for
reinitiated consultation, which required reinitiated consultation
for any agency action that had an ongoing and lasting effect,
plainly required the FWS to reinitiate consultation.281 The court
disagreed with EPIC’s assumption that Pacific Rivers governed
the outcome. Rather, the Ninth Circuit determined that the ITP
was closer to the right-of-way agreement in Sierra Club than the
resource management plan in Pacific Rivers.282 While the plans
in Pacific Rivers were “comprehensive management plans which
govern agency action in forest planning decisions,” the ITP, like
the
right-of-way
agreement,
represented
an
“agency
authorization of a private action and a more limited role for the”
action agency.283 Therefore, the court applied the test from
Sierra Club and examined whether the FWS retained
discretionary control over the ITP that could accrue to the benefit
of the listed species.284
In applying the Sierra Club test, the Ninth Circuit took a
surprisingly limited view of the FWS’ discretionary authority
under the ITP. For example, the ITP provided that “[i]n addition
to addressing the needs of the spotted owl, Simpson’s [plans will
modify] silvicultural systems as appropriate to ensure
compatibility with the habitat requirements of other species.”285
On its face, this provision appeared to give the FWS authority to
modify the ITP to benefit the salmon and murrelet, which are
logically different species than the spotted owl. But, with little
analysis, the court declared that the language only applied to
species listed at the time of the ITP, not species subsequently
280. Id. at 1075. While the request for FWS to consult with itself may appear
overly technical, the parties agreed that issuing an ITP constituted an agency
action for purposes of section 7(a)(2). Id. Indeed, the FWS conducted an internal
consultation process with itself before issuing the initial ITP. Id. at 1077 n.5.
281. Id. at 1079 (citing Pac. Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1053).
282. Id. at 1080.
283. Id (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995)).
284. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1080. But see Root, supra note 7, at
1060-61 (noting that this holding does not place a meaningful limit on
reinitiated consultation because agencies can always choose to include a license
or permit condition that requires reinitiated consultation).
285. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1080.
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listed.286 Further, the court found that although the terms of the
FWS’ biological opinion read, “[r]einitiation of formal consultation
is required if . . . a new species is listed,” the biological opinion did
not give the FWS additional authority to reinitiate consultation,
but only restated the language in § 402.16.287 Particularly, the
court indicated that for an agency to rely on a license or permit
condition to reinitiate consultation upon the listing of a new
species, the condition must specifically reserve the agency’s
discretion to reinitiate consultation upon a new species’ listing.288
c.

Later Cases

More recently, in San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v.
FERC,289 the Ninth Circuit has also indicated that reinitiated
consultation only applies to an ongoing “action” as defined in 50
C.F.R. § 402.02.290 Thus, the court determined that FERC need
not reinitiate consultation on operation of a relicensed
hydroelectric dam because operation of the dam under the
Federal permit did not constitute an agency action.291 But this
result appears contrary to the plain text of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16,
which requires reinitiation whenever “discretionary Federal
involvement or control over the action has been retained or is

286. Id. at 1081 n.6.
287. Id. (alteration in original) (similar statements successfully preserve
discretion for the acting agency when contained in the license or permit). This
feature of the opinion drew a sharp dissent, which argued that the court’s
analysis artificially constricted the terms of the ITP to only cover listed species.
Id. at 1084.
288. See id. The Eastern District of California reached this conclusion in
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1249 (E.D. Cal.
2005). There, the court noted that EPIC suggested that “only very specific
language in permits or contracts explicitly retaining discretionary control to
benefit protected species” could form the basis for reinitiated consultation. Id.
Thus, in that case the court found that an agency could not reinitiate
consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 when the underlying contract did not
contain such language. Id.
289. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y v. FERC, No. 05–77186, 242 Fed.
App'x 462 (9th Cir. July 12, 2007).
290. Id. at 469; see 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2014) (actions are “activities or
programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by
Federal agencies”).
291. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y, 242 Fed. App’x at 469.
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authorized by law.”292
The word “retained” appears to
contemplate activities beyond simple ongoing agency action,
including instances where an action occurs that the Federal
agency continues to authorize or permit and retains discretionary
control over.293
Moreover, San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society relies
heavily on California Sportfishing Protection Alliance for its
interpretation of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.294 However, California
Sportfishing Protection Alliance did not explicitly address
reinitiated consultation or 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 and appears to rely
on a dramatic misreading of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.295 In California
Sportfishing Protection Alliance, without any explanation or
analysis, the Ninth Circuit ignored the definition of agency action
in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, and instead found that the four examples in
the regulation constituted the entire definition of agency action:
(1) actions to conserve listed species, (2) promulgating
regulations, (3) granting licenses or contracts, and (4) modifying
the land, water, or air.296
Given this reading of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, the Sportfishing
court found that operation of a facility under a Federal permit or
license was not a Federal action.297 But the list in 50 C.F.R. §
402.02 is explicitly not exclusive, and the regulation states that
action “means all activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal
agencies.”298 Since operation of a hydroelectric dam under a
FERC license certainly appears to be an action authorized by a
Federal agency, the Ninth Circuit likely misinterpreted the
regulation. Consequently, San Bernardino Audubon Society

292. 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2014) (emphasis added).
293. See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 255 F.3d at 1074-76 (considering the Service’s
obligation to reinitiate consultation on a completed, ongoing ITP).
294. San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y, 242 Fed. App'x at 469 (citing Cal.
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2006)).
295. See generally Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593 (9th
Cir. 2006).
296. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance, 472 F.3d 593 at 598-99 (quoting 50 C.F.R. §
402.02).
297. Id. at 599.
298. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2014) (emphasis added). Indeed, the regulation
includes the phrase, “[e]xamples include, but are not limited to.” Id.
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appears to rest on questionable logic, is not an officially published
case, and no court has relied on its holding in further interpreting
50 C.F.R. § 402.16. Thus, it is best considered as an outlier.299
2.

No Changed Circumstances

Beyond questions of discretionary control over the Federal
project, courts have frequently upheld agency determinations
that the triggers in 50 C.F.R § 402.16 are not met. For example,
in Center for Native Ecosystems v. Cables,300 the Tenth Circuit
considered whether new information regarding the impact of a
Federal project, issuing grazing permits, on the Preble’s mouse, a
listed species, required reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. §
402.16.301 During the initial informal consultation, the Forest
Service and FWS concurred that the grazing permits would not
be likely to adversely affect the mouse.302 As part of that
concurrence, the agencies agreed to several mitigation measures,
one of which was a 60.5% limit on forage-utilization.303 During a
separate-but-related consultation, the FWS and Forest Service
revisited the mitigation measures and found that grazing
activities under the permits had exceeded the forage-utilization
levels in some key areas.304 Nevertheless, the agencies concluded

299. See Freeman, supra note 9, at 121. Nevertheless, Freeman argues that
reinitiated consultation should only be triggered by some additional Federal
action because new species and data on the condition of the species are
inevitable and will continuously arise. Id. But not all new information is
significant. For a complete discussion of how courts evaluate new information’s
significance in the NEPA context, see Maxwell C. Smith and Catherine E.
Kanatas, Acting with No Regret: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective of Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 329
(2014). Possibly, the Ninth Circuit’s interest in further limiting the reach of 50
C.F.R. § 402.16 rests on recognition of the regulation’s uncertain legal basis. See
supra Part III.
300. Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Cables, 509 F.3d 1310 (10th Cir. 2007).
301. Id. at 1313-14. The Forest Service explicitly retained ongoing control over
the grazing permits; the permits stated that they could “be cancelled, in whole
or in part, or otherwise modified, at any time . . . to conform with needed
changes brought about by law, regulation,” or other circumstances. Id. at 1313.
302. Id. at 1315.
303. Id. (stating the agencies initially agreed to a 40-45% level but later
agreed to the increase).
304. Id. at 1317.
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that overall, the average utilization rate was below the 60.5%
limit.305
The Center for Native Ecosystems (CNE) alleged that the
Forest Service should have reinitiated consultation under 50
C.F.R. § 402.16(b) and (c) because the exceeded forage-utilization
showed a previously unconsidered effect on the mouse and a
modification to the project that impacted the mouse.306 CNE
acknowledged that the Forest Service had found the average
forage-utilization within limits in all allotments, but CNE argued
that this measurement rested on an arbitrary policy change.307
CNE argued that previously, the Forest Service had measured
each key area separately and only recently switched to an
averaging method.308
The court responded that the biological assessment did not
specify that the Forest Service would use data from key areas, as
opposed to data averaged over an entire allotment, to evaluate
whether authorized activities exceeded the forage utilization
standards.309 In any event, the court noted that agencies always
retain discretion to change methodology on a reasoned basis.310
In this case, the court found that the agency’s preference of
averages over an entire allotment was reasonable given the
potential for measures of isolated key areas to prove
misleading.311 Thus, Cables illustrates the substantial discretion
agencies have in determining whether a mitigation measure, or
potentially a term of an ITS, has been exceeded. Not only will
courts defer to an agency’s method of calculating the impact on a
listed species, but courts may also give agencies considerable
flexibility in altering those methods.
Several district courts have also taken a deferential approach
to reviewing an agency’s determination on the reinitiation criteria

305. Id. at 1315, 1318.
306. Ctr. for Native Ecosystems, 509 F.3d at 1324-25.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1325-26.
309. Id. at 1326.
310. Id. at 1327 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Lujan, 970 F.2d 757, 762 n.4 (10th Cir.
1992)) (“Changes in policy can be upheld when such change is explained with a
reasoned analysis.”).
311. Id.
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in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.312 For example, the Eastern District of
California found that even though the Service listed a new
species, the red-legged frog, in a project’s vicinity, the agency’s
reasonable determination that the project would have no effect on
the frog relieved the agency from any further duty to consult.313
Similarly, the District Court for the Virgin Islands concluded that
50 C.F.R. § 402.16 did not require FEMA to reinitiate
consultation on an emergency housing project when the agency
extended the duration of the project from six to eighteen
months.314 There, the petitioner did not show that the extension
would harm listed species and the duration of the project was not
instrumental to the Service’s previous finding.315
Likewise, one District Court found that the impacts of whitenoise syndrome on the Indiana Bat did not require the Forest
Service to reinitiate consultation on a forest management plan
when the available evidence showed that the bat had not been
negatively impacted and the population had, in fact, grown by ten
percent.316 In addition, the District Court for the District of
Columbia found that the Forest Service did not need to reinitiate

312. In these cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence to
show that the 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 criteria require reinitiated consultation. See
Oceana, Inc. v. Byson, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1061-62 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
313. Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 844, 877 (E.D. Cal. 2004)
(quotations omitted). In that case, the Army Corps of Engineers preserved
discretion and control over an ongoing residential development product through
a clause in a dredge and fill permit that allowed the Corps to “reevaluate its
decision on this permit at any time the circumstances warrant.” Id. at 855
(internal citations omitted). Strikingly, despite several requests from the Service
to reinitiate consultation, the Court disagreed with the Service’s claims that
new information, changes to the project, and violations of the limits in the ITS
required reinitiated consultation under 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. Id. at 856-57, 873-76.
Specifically, the court concluded that sightings of listed species within the
project area did not constitute new information when the biological opinion
noted the presence of the species in the vicinity, that an appreciably greater
spatial impact on the habitat of a listed species than initially thought was only a
minor modification to the project, and that speculation from the Service that the
project exceeded the incidental take levels did not suffice to trigger reinitiated
consultation. Id. at 874-76.
314. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d
529, 550 (D.V.I. 1998).
315. Id. at 550.
316. Heartwood, Inc. v. Agpaoa, 611 F. Supp. 2d 675, 692-93 (E.D. Ky. 2009),
rev’d on other grounds, 628 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2009).
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consultation on oil and gas leases to account for new information
showing the leases would affect more grizzly bears than originally
thought.317 The court noted that the underlying biological
opinion explicitly recognized the importance of the area to grizzly
bears and the uncertainty of the number of grizzly bears in the
area.318 Thus, courts have upheld agencies’ determinations not to
reinitiate consultation even when the agency changes the
methodology for determining impacts on species, triples the
duration of a project, or learns that the project may impact many
more members of the species than initially thought. Overall,
these cases suggest that when new circumstance do not
significantly change the underlying reasoning in the biological
opinion or the ITS, courts will not likely find a duty to reinitiate
consultation.
3.

Congress Intervention Establishing That
Reinitiation Is Not Required

Congress can also step in and create laws that remove any
requirement to reinitiate consultation. Such was the case in Mt.
Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan.319 As the Ninth Circuit
stated, Red Squirrel is a case about the “conflict between those
who would build bigger and better telescopes and those who
would shelter the endangered Mount Graham red squirrel from
the destruction of its habitat.”320
This conflict involved the Sierra Club, a number of Federal
agencies, and Congress. In this case, there was considerable delay
in getting telescopes built on Mt. Graham, the critical habitat of
the endangered red squirrel.321 Given the delay and the desire to
build the telescopes, Congress interceded and enacted the
Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act.322 The Act provided for a twophase building project and appeared to state that the ESA was
deemed satisfied as to the first phase.323
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

Wyo. Outdoor Council v. Bosworth, 284 F. Supp. 2d 81, 95 (2003).
Id.
Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
Madigan, 954 F.2d at 1443.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1446.
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Environmental groups raised multiple challenges, including
a challenge that the first phase of construction triggered the need
to reinitiate consultation.324
To determine if reinitiated
consultation was required, or if the ESA was deemed satisfied,
the court looked first to the Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act,
which it determined was ambiguous on the point.325 Given this,
the court looked to legislative history to determine if Congress
had in fact meant to waive ESA requirements with respect to the
first phase of construction.326 The court found that the legislative
history, although limited, clearly suggested “Congress intended
that the first three telescopes be built immediately, without being
subject to the possibility of delay inherent in any reinitiation of
consultation.”327 Thus, the court stated “the requirements of
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act are deemed satisfied as
to the entire first phase of construction.”328 The court made clear

324. Id. at 1447.
325. Id. at 1452.
326. Madigan, 954 F.2d at 1456-57. Notably, the court did not defer to the
Service’s interpretation of the statute, because the Service’s position on whether
the statute contemplated reinitiated consultation changed. Specifically, the
court stated:
Prior to the initiation of the present litigation, the Forest Service
indicated its belief that the Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act
permitted the reinitiation of consultation regarding the first phase of
construction. Subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, the agency's
position changed. Given this fluctuation over the course of two years,
we decline to rely on the Forest Service's “expertise.”
Id. at 1457.
327. Id. at 1453. The court also included excerpts of statements made on the
floor of the Senate. “Three telescopes will be built immediately. They can no
longer be stalled by process, by litigation, or by whim. Four telescopes can be
built in the future after a timely conclusion to the [Environmental Impact
Statement] and consultation between Fish and Wildlife, Forest Service, and the
University of Arizona.” Id. at 1454 (citing 134 CONG. REC. 15,741 (daily ed. Oct.
13, 1988) (statement of Sen. McCain)). Interestingly enough, two years after the
statute was enacted, the same speaker said “[w]e have always believed that the
Arizona–Idaho Conservation Act contemplated the possibility of reinitiation of
consultation where new information has been found.” Id. at 1456. These
statements lend further support to the conclusion in section IV that despite the
ESA’s silence on reinitiated consultation, Congress has long understood
reinitiated consultation to be an established and important part of the ESA’s
statutory scheme.
328. Id. at 1456.
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that this waiver did not apply to the second phase of construction
(i.e., the final four telescopes):
The fact that Congress made authorization of the final four
telescopes contingent on an evaluation of the impact on the red
squirrel of construction of the first three telescopes also indicates
that the legislators sought to achieve a workable and practical
compromise between the needs of the scientific community on the
one hand and the legitimate concerns of the environmentalists on
the other.329

Given this reading of the Act, the court affirmed the district
court’s summary judgment on Sierra Club’s reinitiation claims. In
particular, the court held that Sierra Club’s claims that
reinitiation was required given new information were irrelevant
due to the waiver.330
In Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk and Yowlumne
Tejon Indians v. U.S. Department of Energy,331 the Ninth Circuit
also found that the Department of Energy (DOE) need not
reinitiate consultation when a statute required the agency to sell
a specific oil field and explicitly provided that the existing BiOp
and ITS would transfer to the purchaser.332 The court found that
by specifying that the ITS would accompany title to the oil field,
Congress explicitly intended to excuse the DOE from its duty to
reinitiate consultation on the action.333 Moreover, the court
agreed with the DOE that requiring reinitiated consultation
under these circumstances would serve no purpose because, by
law, the transferee would still operate the oil field in accordance
with the ITS and would therefore not generate any new impacts
on listed species.334 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has also declined to

329. Id. at 1458.
330. Id. at 1448-49, 1460, 1461 (discussing “reconsultation claims” associated
with the “Summary Judgment Appeal” and the “Jurisdictional Appeal”).
331. Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk & Yowlumne Tejon Indians v.
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 232 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000).
332. Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk & Yowlumne Tejon Indians, 232
F.3d at 1302, 1303, 1308-09 (citing National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 3412(a), 110 Stat. 186, 631)).
333. Id. at 1309.
334. Id.
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require consultation when legislation clearly overrides agency
discretion to implement the terms of an ITS.
C. Conclusions
While
reinitiated
consultation
poses
important
considerations for action agencies and practitioners, courts have
seldom found that agencies improperly refused to reinitiate
consultation. Recently, courts have typically taken a deferential
view toward agency interpretations of 50 C.F.R. § 402.16.
Nevertheless, courts will carefully scrutinize ITSs to ensure that
they contain reasonable triggers for reinitiated consultation. As a
result, practitioners and agencies would be well advised to ensure
that ITSs are adequate at the time the agency undertakes a
proposed action.
VI. CONCLUSION
A request for reinitiated consultation need not end in a
catastrophe for either a listed species or an agency or permittee.
While courts have readily assumed firm legal ground for
reinitiated consultation, the statute is actually silent on this
count. Fortunately the legislative history and clear policy ends of
the ESA support the practice. As described above, courts will
typically require reinitiated consultation when it is within the
action agency’s discretionary authority and one of the reinitiated
criteria in 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 are clearly met. While courts will
carefully scrutinize underlying ITSs to ensure that they provide
meaningful criteria for reinitiating consultation, courts normally
adopt a deferential approach to agency determinations of whether
the 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 criteria are met. In these circumstances,
reinitiated consultation may actually further the ends of the
agency and applicant, in that it will ensure that the protections of
any ITS remain valid or that any needed ITS is adopted.
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